MENSAH vs. GHANA FOOTBALL ASSOCIATION AND OTHERS [1989]DLSC639

Date	1989-01-24
Suit No.
Citation No.	[1989]DLSC639

ADADE JSC

TAYLOR JSC

FRANCOIS JSC

AMUA-SEKYI J.S.C.

ESSIEM J.A.

N. KUENYEHIA (WITH HIM G. K. ACQUAH) FOR THE APPELLANT.

P. D. OFEI (WITH HIM SYLVESTER WILLIAMS) FOR THE RESPONDENTS.

[1989]DLSC639
																																						<div class="restriction-wrapper">
														<div class="container-lg">
															<div class="row">
																<div class="col-md-12 restricted-content">
																	<div class="restricted-content-img-wrapper">
																		<div class="lock-icon bounce-7">
																			<img class=""
																				src="https://www.dennislawgh.com/dl-assets/dl-images/lock-content.png"
																				alt="Subscription based content">
																		</div>
																	</div>
																	 
																		<a href="https://www.dennislawgh.com/login"
																		class="btn btn-primary btn-lg"
																		style="font-family: 'open sans'; text-transform: capitalize; border-radius: 8px"> 
																		Login to Read Full Case </a>
																	 
																	
																</div>
															</div>
														</div>
													</div>
													<main id="main" class="content" style="min-height: 60rem" >MENSAH <o:p></o:p>vs. <o:p></o:p>GHANA FOOTBALL ASSOCIATION
AND OTHERS<o:p></o:p>[SUPREME COURT, ACCRA] <o:p></o:p>[1989-90] 2 GLR 1<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in">

DATE:
24
JANUARY 1989<o:p></o:p>

</div>COUNSEL:&nbsp;&nbsp; <o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 0in 0in">

N. KUENYEHIA (WITH HIM G. K. ACQUAH) FOR THE
APPELLANT.<o:p></o:p>

P. D. OFEI (WITH HIM SYLVESTER WILLIAMS) FOR THE
RESPONDENTS.<o:p></o:p>

</div>CORAM:
<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 0in 0in">

ADADE, TAYLOR, FRANCOIS, AMUA-SEKYI
JJ.S.C.<o:p></o:p>

</div><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>JUDGMENT OF AMUA-SEKYI J.S.C.<o:p></o:p>Amua-Sekyi
J.S.C. delivered the judgment of the majority. On 4 May 1988, the High Court,
Cape Coast gave judgment for the plaintiff, Kojo Mensah, for: (a) declaration
that Accra Standfast Football Club (Standfast) are not qualified to play in the
first division of the 1988-89 National Football League; that Cape Coast
Venomous Vipers Football Club (Vipers) are qualified to play in the said
division of the league; that the decisions of the disciplinary committee and
the appeals committee of the defendant, Ghana Football Association, to the
contrary are null and void; (b) an order setting aside the decision of the
defendants confirming that of the appeal committee; (c) an injunction
restraining the defendants and the National Sports Council from proceeding with
the current league without the participation of Vipers; and (d) an injunction
restraining Standfast from participating in the said league. Being dissatisfied
with this judgment, the defendants lodged an appeal with the Court of Appeal
and applied to the High Court, Cape Coast for a stay of execution pending the
final determination of the appeal. The application was refused, principally on
the ground that the judgment was non-executable. The defendants repeated their
application before the Court of Appeal which granted a stay on the main ground
that the appeal was likely to succeed. This appeal is from the decision of the
Court of Appeal.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>The
application to the High Court and the Court of Appeal were brought under rule
27 (1) of the Court of Appeal Rules, 1962 (L.I. 218) as amended by the Court of
Appeal (Amendment) Rules, 1975 (L.I. 1002), and rule 28 of the said rules, as
amended by the Court of Appeal (Amendment) Rules, 1969 (L.I. 618). Rule 27 (1)
reads:<o:p></o:p>“27. (1)
An appeal shall not operate as a stay of execution of proceedings under the
judgment or decision appealed except where the court below or the Court
otherwise orders— (a) in the case of the Court below, upon application made
already or by motion on notice to it, and<o:p></o:p>(b) in
the case of the Court, upon application made to it by motion on notice, and
except as aforesaid no intermediate act or proceeding shall be invalidated.”<o:p></o:p>And rule
28, also, reads:<o:p></o:p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt;
margin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;mso-pagination:none;border:none;mso-padding-alt:
31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt;mso-border-shadow:yes">“28.
Subject to the provisions of these Rules and to any other enactment, where
under any enactment an application may be made either to the Court below or to
the Court, it shall be made in the first instance to the Court below, but if
the Court below refuses to grant the application, the applicant shall be
entitled to have the application determined by the Court.”<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>Thus,
provided the judgment is executable, it cannot be gainsaid that the defendants
were entitled to apply first to the High Court and, when the application was
refused, to the Court of Appeal for a stay of execution of the judgment. The
right conferred by the said rules would be illusory if the losing party in a
case were required to comply with the terms of the judgments before applying
for a stay of execution.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>The
question therefore is whether the judgment is non-executable. The situation is,
in our view, similar to a judgment decreeing title to land in favour of a party
and granting him an order of perpetual injunction for the protection of his
rights. Such a judgment is executable in the sense that any breach of the order
renders the person liable to attachment for contempt. In this case, if the
defendants had, at any time before a stay was granted, continued the league
with the participation of Standfast, and without the participation of Vipers,
the defendants, the National Sports Council, Standfast, their officials or all
or some or any of them would undoubtedly have been brough</main>