NARTEY-TOKOLI AND OTHERS vs. VOLTA ALUMINIUM CO. LTD. [1989]DLSC646

Date	1989-05-25
Suit No.
Citation No.	[1989]DLSC646

SOWAH C.J.

FRANCOIS JSC

AMUA-SEKYI J.S.C.

OSEI-HWERE JA

LAMPTEY J.A.

JONES-MENSAH FOR THE APPLICANTS.

BANNERMAN (WITH HIM GEORGE THOMPSON) FOR THE RESPONDENTS.

[1989]DLSC646
																																						<div class="restriction-wrapper">
														<div class="container-lg">
															<div class="row">
																<div class="col-md-12 restricted-content">
																	<div class="restricted-content-img-wrapper">
																		<div class="lock-icon bounce-7">
																			<img class=""
																				src="https://www.dennislawgh.com/dl-assets/dl-images/lock-content.png"
																				alt="Subscription based content">
																		</div>
																	</div>
																	 
																		<a href="https://www.dennislawgh.com/login"
																		class="btn btn-primary btn-lg"
																		style="font-family: 'open sans'; text-transform: capitalize; border-radius: 8px"> 
																		Login to Read Full Case </a>
																	 
																	
																</div>
															</div>
														</div>
													</div>
													<main id="main" class="content" style="min-height: 60rem" >NARTEY-TOKOLI AND OTHERS<o:p></o:p>&nbsp;vs. <o:p></o:p>VOLTA ALUMINIUM CO. LTD.<o:p></o:p>[SUPREME COURT, ACCRA] <o:p></o:p>[1989-90] 2 GLR 338<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in">

DATE:
25
APRIL 1989<o:p></o:p>

</div>COUNSEL:&nbsp;&nbsp; <o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 0in 0in">

JONES-MENSAH FOR THE APPLICANTS.<o:p></o:p>

BANNERMAN (WITH HIM GEORGE THOMPSON) FOR THE
RESPONDENTS.<o:p></o:p>

</div>CORAM:
<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 0in 0in">

SOWAH C.J., FRANCOIS, AMUA-SEKYI
JJ.S.C.,<o:p></o:p>

OSEI-HWERE AND LAMPTEY JJ.A.<o:p></o:p>

</div><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>JUDGMENT OF SOWAH C.J.<o:p></o:p>Sowah
C.J. delivered the ruling of the court. The plaintiffs, 463 of them, sued the
Volta Aluminium Co. Ltd. in a single action for reliefs connected with the
termination of their engagement with the company. We make no comment on the
form of the writ. Dissatisfied with the result of the action at the High Court,
the plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeal. The appellate court described
this second attempt as “partially successful” and awarded costs to the
plaintiffs.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>Dissatisfied
further with certain orders and pronouncements of the Court of Appeal, the
plaintiffs have sought to test the viability of that decision at the Supreme
Court. The judgment of the Court of Appeal was delivered on 20 December 1988.
The plaintiffs claimed that they received a copy of the judgment on 31 January
1989 and being caught on the horns of a dilemma as to their rights of appeal
sought unsuccessfully for an extension of time to appeal. This course was
predicated on a diffidence as to the nature of the judgment of the Court of
Appeal, whether final or interlocutory, and as to the legal construction of the
Courts (Amendment) Law, 1987 (P.N.D.C.L. 191) amending by insertion of a new
section 3 into the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372).<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>On the
first issue, the plaintiffs equate the refusal by the Court of Appeal to extend
time with a refusal to grant leave, the statutory two weeks for filing
interlocutory appeals having expired; they urge special circumstances for the
grant of the relief of extension by this court. The hurdle grounded on
P.N.D.C.L. 191 amending Act 372 involves the true construction of the rights of
appeal accorded a litigant who has failed in the court below. Four stated
categories are set out in section 3 (1) (a), (b), (c) and (d). Section 3 (2)
which is the relevant provision in this matter is as follows:<o:p></o:p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt;
margin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;mso-pagination:none;border:none;mso-padding-alt:
31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt;mso-border-shadow:yes">“(2)
Where a decision of the Court of Appeal confirms the decision appealed against
from a lower court, an appeal shall lie against such decision of the Court of
Appeal which may on its own motion or on an oral application made by the
aggrieved party decide whether or not to grant such leave, and where the<o:p></o:p>Court of
Appeal refuses to grant the leave to appeal the aggrieved party may apply to the
Supreme Court for such leave.”<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>Counsel
for the defendant-company contends that the plaintiffs were unsuccessful on a
number of issues determined by the trial High Court. When these matters were
re-agitated before the Court of Appeal, they were affirmed and not reversed;
consequently the plaintiffs are caught by Act 372, s. 3 (2) as inserted by
P.N.D.C.L. 191, which imposes a statutory hurdle on them of obtaining leave
either from the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court before the appeal could
properly be heard.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>The
argument must be faulted on the conception of strands of a decision rather than
a single decision. The amended provision in section 3 (2) of Act 372 talks of a
decision—not a dissected, truncated or dismembered decision. A decision must be
regarded as a whole—a complete entity. Wharton’s Law Lexicon and Earl Jowitt’s
Dictionary of English Law, both describe a decision simply in two words as “a
judgment.” A judgment declares either for a successful party or designates a
losing one. Consequently, the amended section curtailing rights of appeal,
comes into play only when two successive judgments are against an appellant.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>