L’AIR LIQUIDE GHANA LTD vs. ANIN AND OTHERS [1990]DLCA2270

Date	1990-05-17
Suit No.
Citation No.	[1990]DLCA2270

AMPIAH JA

ESSIEM JA

OFORI-BOATENG JJA

FRANK SAWYERR FOR THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANTS.

AIDOO FOR THE PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENTS.

[1990]DLCA2270
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													<main id="main" class="content" style="min-height: 60rem" >L’AIR
LIQUIDE GHANA LTD<o:p></o:p>vs.<o:p></o:p>ANIN
AND OTHERS<o:p></o:p>[COURT OF
APPEAL, ACCRA]<o:p></o:p>[1991] 1
GLR 460<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in">

</div>COUNSEL:<o:p></o:p>FRANK
SAWYERR FOR THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANTS.<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in">

AIDOO FOR
THE PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENTS. <o:p></o:p>

AMPIAH,
ESSIEM AND OFORI-BOATENG JJA<o:p></o:p>

</div>JUDGMENT
OF OFORI-BOATENG JA.<o:p></o:p>This is
an appeal from the Circuit Court, Accra presided over by her Honour Judge
Baabu. The case of the defendant-appellants, L’Air Liquide Ghana Ltd
(hereinafter referred to as the appellants), was that they rightly dismissed
summarily the plaintiff-respondents (hereinafter referred to as the
respondents) on 17 September 1985 for stealing carbide, the property of the
company. That the dismissal was in accordance with article 24 of the collective
agreement.<o:p></o:p>The
judgment against them must therefore be set aside. According to the undisputed
facts of the case, some three boys were caught with three pieces of carbide.
These boys identified the three respondents as the persons who sold them the
items; and on the orders of the appellants, they were taken to the police
station and kept overnight.<o:p></o:p>The next
day the respondents were discharged. No charges were preferred against them and
the appellants were advised to take a departmental action rather than a
criminal action through the courts.<o:p></o:p>Unless the
police was being extremely facetious, a police officer to whom an offence had
been reported would investigate it, and if he found that an offence,
particularly a felony such as stealing, had been committed he would charge the
offender. If he failed to do so, it would simply mean that after the
investigation he did not find sufficient facts to support any such charge.<o:p></o:p>The only
conclusion I can therefore arrive at from the fact that the respondents were
not even asked to make a statement and were asked to go home after the police
had interrogated those three boys, was that the police found nothing against
them after the investigation. Indeed according to the police officer
investigating the case, the three boys in this case could not at the police
station identify the respondents as the persons who sold them the carbide.<o:p></o:p>Under the
employment laws of this country however, the dismissal of an employee does not
necessarily have to depend on the conviction of the employee by a court of law
for a crime. A properly conducted disciplinary inquiry which concludes that an
employee has committed a criminal offence although he has been acquitted by a
court of law can still sustain a dismissal depending on the terms of the
employment. It is accordingly within the power of the appellants in accordance
with exhibit B to conduct a disciplinary inquiry into the alleged conduct of
the respondents and, if found guilty, to dismiss them summarily or otherwise
reinstate them if they want to continue working with them. After these
important preliminary issues the main grounds of the appeal may now be dealt
with.<o:p></o:p>The main
ground of appeal canvassed by the appellants was that there was evidence that
the respondents were identified by the three boys as the persons who sold the
carbide to them. That there was also evidence that the respondents confessed
before witnesses during an inquiry that they were compelled to steal the
carbide because of financial difficulties and apologised for their offence.<o:p></o:p>This
argument was countered by the respondents that there was no proper
identification parade at which anybody identified them as culprits and that
during the inquiry proceedings the appellants did not call a single witness to
substantiate the allegation that there was an identification parade. That the
three persons to whom the carbide was supposed to have been sold were also not
called to give evidence for the appellants. That in effect, the so-called
inquiry was just a farce that violated the principles of natural justice.<o:p></o:p>The
appellants in reply say that the respondents should have come to court and won
on the strength of their own case and not on the weakness of the appellants’
case for not having called this witness or that witness.<o:p></o:p>After a
very careful consideration of the arguments from both parties on both the facts
and the law of the case, I am of the opinion that the whole case hangs on the
legal effect of the collective agreement between the Trades Union Congress
(TUC) and L’Air Liquide Ghana Ltd provided under exhibit B, subsection 24(c)
which is the contractual basis of the parties to this case,</main>