REPUBLIC vs. ASOGLI TRADITIONAL COUNCIL AND OTHERS; EX PARTE TOGBE AMORNI V II [1991]DLHC2058

Date	1991-07-31
Suit No.
Citation No.	[1991]DLHC2058

ACQUAH J.

V. DOTSE FOR W.A. N. ADUMUA-BOSSMAN FOR THE APPLICANT.

AVORNYOTSE FOR THE FIRST AND SECOND RESPONDENTS.

FRANK ADEEKU FOR THE THIRD AND FOURTH RESPONDENTS.

[1991]DLHC2058
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													<main id="main" class="content" style="min-height: 60rem" ><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:&quot;Book Antiqua&quot;,&quot;serif&quot;;
mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Book Antiqua&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Book Antiqua&quot;;
color:#00B0F0">REPUBLIC<o:p></o:p><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:&quot;Book Antiqua&quot;,&quot;serif&quot;;
mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Book Antiqua&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Book Antiqua&quot;;
color:#00B0F0">vs.<o:p></o:p><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:&quot;Book Antiqua&quot;,&quot;serif&quot;;
mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Book Antiqua&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Book Antiqua&quot;;
color:#00B0F0">ASOGLI TRADITIONAL COUNCIL AND OTHERS; EX PARTE TOGBE AMORNI V
II<o:p></o:p>[HIGH COURT, HO]<o:p></o:p>[1992] 2 GLR 347<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in">

</div>COUNSEL:<o:p></o:p>V. DOTSE FOR W.A. N. ADUMUA-BOSSMAN FOR THE APPLICANT.<o:p></o:p>AVORNYOTSE FOR THE FIRST AND SECOND RESPONDENTS.<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in">

FRANK ADEEKU FOR THE THIRD AND FOURTH RESPONDENTS. <o:p></o:p>

</div>JUDGMENT OF ACQUAH J.<o:p></o:p>This is an application for an extension of time to apply for leave
for the writ of certiorari to quash the judgment of the Asogli Traditional
Council dated 11 July 1969 and the appellate judgment of the Volta Regional
House of Chiefs dated 29 January 1986 in respect of suit No. 2/1968 entitled
Ametsitsi v. Kuma alias Togbe Amorni VII.<o:p></o:p>On 27 May 1991 I dismissed an earlier application by the same
applicant for leave to apply for certiorari to quash the said judgments on the
grounds that since the judgments sought to be quashed were delivered over six
months ago, Order 59, r.3 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N.
140A) forbids such applications unless the applicant obtains extension of time
to initiate such application. That application was argued by Mr Dogoe on behalf
of the applicant’s solicitor, Mr. Adumua-Bossman, who appeared personally on 27
May 1991 to take the ruling.<o:p></o:p>After the ruling had been read, Mr. Adumua-Bossman indicated that
the reason for their not asking for extension of time was that the judgments,
in their view, being void and procured in breach of the rules of natural
justice, the principle is that there is no time limit in applying to set aside
such void judgments. Consequently, their application was not affected by the provisions
of the said Order 59, r.3 of L.N. 140A. As an authority for this proposition,
counsel relied on Mosi v. Bagyina [1963] 1 G.L.R. 337, S.C.<o:p></o:p>It’s unfortunate that Mr. Dogoe did not raise this issue in the
course of his arguments in that application. Nevertheless, since Mr. Adumua
Bossman’s submission appears to be generally accepted by a host of legal
practitioners and some distinguished jurists, I think it will not be out of
place to examine it now with a view to determining its proper scope of operation.<o:p></o:p>I am aware that Mr. Adumua Bossman’s submission has the full
support of no less a jurist than his Lordship Abban J.S.C, a judge I have
profound respect for. In Republic v. Commissioner for Local Government, Ex
parte Nii Amar II [1975] 2 G.L.R. 122, Abban J. (as he then was) had an
occasion to consider this submission. The applicant, Nii Amar II, had argued
that the orders sought to be quashed being invalid, there was indeed no need
for an extension of time to apply for leave under Order 59, r.3 of L.N. 140A.
The respondents after submitting that the orders were valid further argued that
assuming the decision and orders were null and void, the applicant still needed
extension of time because the principle that there is no time limit within
which a party affected by a void decision may apply to have it set aside,
applies only to decisions or orders of courts of record and not to those of
inferior tribunals.<o:p></o:p>In rejecting this submission, Abban J. (as he then was) delivered
himself as follows at 128:<o:p></o:p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt;
margin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;mso-pagination:none;border:none;mso-padding-alt:
31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt;mso-border-shadow:yes">“If the argument of learned counsel is accepted the implication
would be that the decisions of inferior tribunals, or other judicial bodies,
which are not courts of record, are rather superior to those of the courts of
record. Even if a void decision of the High Court which is a superior court of
record can be set aside at any time on the principles of Mosi’s case (supra),
and that lapse of years cannot be a bar for so doing and the aggrieved party is
entitled ex debito justitiae to have it set aside, how come that void decisions
of inferior tribunals, like a committee of inquiry, cannot be subject to the
principles laid down in Mosi’s case? The principles enunciated in Mosi’s case
are so fundamental that they cannot in any way be compromised, neither can they
tolerate any exception in favour of any court, be it a tribunal or a committee
of inquiry. I therefore reject the submission of learned counsel for the second
respondent, and I hold that once a decision is void, no matter the court or the
tribunal from which it emanates, it is void for all time and, as laid down in
Mosi’s case, there will be no time limit within which steps should be taken to
quash it.”<o:p></o:p>His lordship then examined the decisions and orders in issue and
finding them to be valid concluded at 139:<o:p></o:p>