KWAGYANE I vs. AGYEI AND ANOTHER [1992]DLCA4242

Date	1992-12-10
Suit No.
Citation No.	[1992]DLCA4242

BROBBEY JA

AMPIAH JA

KWAPONG J

[1992]DLCA4242
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													<main id="main" class="content" style="min-height: 60rem" >KWAGYANE I<o:p></o:p>vs.<o:p></o:p>AGYEI AND ANOTHER<o:p></o:p>[COURT
OF APPEAL]<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in">

[1993
- 4] 1 GBR 57 – 58&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; DATE: 10 DECEMBER 1992<o:p></o:p>

</div>CORAM:<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in">

BROBBEY JA, AMPIAH JA,
KWAPONG J<o:p></o:p>

</div>BROBBEY JA. On Thursday,
the 5th of November 1992, we dismissed an appeal against the judgment of Moses
Abakah J sitting in the Koforidua High Court. Counsel for the appellant then
applied for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court.<o:p></o:p>In the argument, counsel
grounded his application on the following points:<o:p></o:p>&nbsp;“1) that the judgment raised a number of legal
issues such as the exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court
over inferior courts and the extension of prerogative writs.<o:p></o:p>(2) whether or not Afua Fofie could be
said to have been a judge in her own cause or could have been said to have
acted improperly by her failure to disclose her interest when every one sitting
on the case or appearing before the panel knew what her interest was.”<o:p></o:p>In practice the rationale
for requiring leave of this court before proceeding to the Supreme Court is
said to be this: when this court affirms a decision of a lower court appealed
against, at least three of four judges (quite often of the superior courts)
would have expressed the view that the appellant’s case is unmeritorious. The
appellant therefore has to show some significant need why, in the interest of
justice, he should be given another chance to go to the Supreme Court. If that
need is not shown and leave is granted just for the asking the courts would be
encouraging litigation to be unnecessarily protracted when the courts have
clearly evinced the intention by repeated judgments to ensure that the
appellant is not merely wasting time by fighting a battle the court knows he
will not win.<o:p></o:p>If there is one case which
falls into this latter category of cases, it is the application made by the
applicant for leave to appeal in this case. I make this point for two reasons:
firstly, there is no new point about the first ground which appellant’s counsel
describes as raising legal issues. The issues on the supervisory jurisdiction
of the High Court are so hackneyed that our law reports abound with authorities
on them. Leave cannot be granted for the sake of arguing a legal point which is
already well settled in the courts.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>Secondly, the ground which
relates to the principle that one cannot be a judge in one’s cause is an
obvious one. There is no doubt that Afua Fofie was the one who personally
benefited from a decision of the panel. Even the appellant does not deny this
point. Yet Afua Fofie was undoubtedly among the panel which adjudicated over
the dispute.<o:p></o:p>We have expressed the view
that we do not wish to create the impression that there can be exceptions to
situations where a person can knowingly be a judge in his own cause. Barring
cases of necessity, there can be no such exception. In the final order of this
court the parties were permitted to pursue this dispute in the appropriate
chieftaincy tribunal. This was not therefore a case in which we closed the
doors to the parties as far as further litigation was concerned. Our
pre-occupation was, and still is, that justice should not only be done but
should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done. We were emphatic that
this case involved the well-settled principles of natural justice which will be
followed by other quasi-tribunals and therefore the record should be
straightened so that the right procedure would be followed. We would be
perpetuating error if we grant this leave to appeal to the Supreme Court.<o:p></o:p>The appellant won the case
in 1931. If the appellant is convinced that she won the case at the 1931
tribunal on its merits why should she entertain any qualms or apprehension
about re-litigating in the appropriate forum to vindicate her cause.<o:p></o:p>We would be encouraging
the parties to waste their time and their resources if we were to grant the
appellant’s leave to proceed to the Supreme Court. The application for leave to
appeal is unmeritorious and is therefore refused.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>AMPIAH JA. I agree.<o:p></o:p>

KWAPONG J. I also agree.<o:p></o:p></main>