REPUBLIC vs. JUDICIAL COMMITTEE OF SEKONDI TRADITIONAL COUNCIL, EX PARTE ANGU II [1992]DLCA4284

REPUBLIC vs. JUDICIAL COMMITTEE OF SEKONDI TRADITIONAL COUNCIL, EX PARTE ANGU... [1992]DLCA4284

Date	1992-12-10
Suit No.
Citation No.	[1992]DLCA4284

LAMPTEY JA

KPEGAH JA

FORSTER JA

AHENKORAH (WITH HIM SPIO) FOR THE APPELLANTS.

OCRAN FOR THE RESPONDENTS

[1992]DLCA4284
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													<main id="main" class="content" style="min-height: 60rem" >REPUBLIC <o:p></o:p>vs. <o:p></o:p>JUDICIAL COMMITTEE OF
SEKONDI TRADITIONAL COUNCIL, EX PARTE ANGU II<o:p></o:p>[COURT
OF APPEAL, SEKONDI]<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in">

[1993 - 4] 1 GBR 238 – 240&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;DATE: 10 DECEMBER 1992<o:p></o:p>

</div>COUNSEL:<o:p></o:p>AHENKORAH
(WITH HIM SPIO) FOR THE APPELLANTS.<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in">

OCRAN
FOR THE RESPONDENTS<o:p></o:p>

</div>CORAM:<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in">

</div>LAMPTEY
JA. On 17 May 1988 Kweku Abuna II and 2 others commenced a chieftaincy dispute
in the Sekondi Traditional Council against Nana Kobina Angu II and 4 others.
They sought a declaration that “the nomination, confinement and out-dooring of
one Ocran, 2nd respondent herein, was in breach of customary law”. They sought
other reliefs as well. A judicial committee of three members was constituted by
the council with Nana Ntim Gyakare II as the chairman of that committee. At the
first sitting of the judicial committee, Nana Kobina Angu II and the other
respondent objected to the inclusion of Nana Ntim Gyakare II on the membership
of the committee. They were heard fully on their objection. By its ruling dated
8 July 1988, the committee dismissed the objection in limine and assumed
jurisdiction in the chieftaincy dispute. Nana Angu II and the respondents
submitted to the jurisdiction of the committee and fully participated
throughout the hearing of the chieftaincy dispute on the merits. At the end of
the hearing the judicial committee delivered a “majority judgment” and a
“minority judgment”.<o:p></o:p>They
gave judgment for the petitioners and granted the following reliefs:<o:p></o:p>“(a) a declaration that the
nomination, confinement and out-dooring of the 2nd respondent Emmanuel Ocran on
or about the 30 April 1988 as a chief or sub-chief or caretaker of Kweikuma is
null and void and is of no legal effect ...”<o:p></o:p>On
this same issue the “minority judgment” held as follows:<o:p></o:p>“The nomination, confinement and
out-dooring of Mr Emmanuel Ocran as chief, the first time in the history of
Kweikuma, should have been preceded by a meeting of all the elders of Kokodo
Ebiradze Stool family of Fijai before confronting the people of Kweikuma for
their acceptance and concurrence. It is my view that such consultations were
not done by both sides considering the division within the family. The
nomination confinement and out-dooring of Mr Ocran as chief on 30th April 1988
was therefore hasty...”<o:p></o:p>It
will be seen from the above passages that the “majority judgment” and the
“minority judgment” held that the nomination, confinement and out-dooring of Mr
Ocran breached customary law and practice. That was the declaration sought by
the petitioners. Nana Angu II and the other respondents had not appealed
against the judgment (majority and minority) of the judicial committee even
though they were aggrieved and dissatisfied with it. What they did was to apply
to the High Court, Sekondi for leave to issue a writ of certiorari to bring the
“majority judgment” before that court for it to be quashed. Leave was duly
granted to Nana Angu II and others. The application was heard on the merits. On
the 8th February 1991 the High Court, Sekondi quashed the judgment of the
judicial committee dated 14 June 1989. Aggrieved and dissatisfied with the
judgment of the High Court, Nana Kweku Abuna and the others appealed to this
court.<o:p></o:p>One
ground of appeal argued before us was that the trial judge misdirected himself
on the law on bias. Learned counsel for appellants submitted that the case
before the lower court was not an allegation of real bias on the part of the
chairman of the judicial committee. He stated that the case put forward by the
respondents was one of real likelihood of bias. He argued that the two
situations were governed by different principles of law. On the facts before
the lower court the respondents failed to make out a case of real bias on the
part of the chairman of the judicial committee. In reply learned counsel for
the respondents submitted that the trial judge applied the right principles and
came to the right decision on the facts before him. He referred to the
admission by the chairman of the committee that there was a stool land boundary
dispute between his stool and the stool of the 1st respondent. He contended
that the finding by the learned judge that the admission was sufficient
evidence of bias on the part of the chairman cannot be impeached.<o:p></o:p>It
seems to me that I must address the issue as to the nature and type of the
complaint before the High Court and the standard of proof required by law. On
the facts before the court was it a complaint of real likelihood of bias or on
the other hand a case of real bias apparent on the face of the record? To
enable one to answer this question it is in my view necessary and desirable to
determine at what stage the complaint of bias was made. Was the complaint made
before actual hearing of the case on the merits commenced or was it made during
the hearing of the dispute on the merits; or was it made after hearing had been
concluded and after judgment had been delivered? It is trite learning that
different principles of law apply to the different situations I have outlined above.
That this is the state of the law was stated with clarity in the Supreme Court
case of Bilson v Apaloo [1981] GLR 15. At page 21 Anin JSC wrote as follows:<o:p></o:p>“In the present case, the plaintiff
has alleged inter alia, judicial impropriety and bias against the two said
members of this present panel of the Supreme Court in connection with the
discharge of their judicial duties in the Court of Appeal exercising the
functions of the Supreme Court in the case of Tuffour v Attorney-General.
Whether or not plaintiff’s serious allegations of bias and judicial impropriety
are well-founded is a matter going to the merits of the substantive action
which should properly be decided after evidence and legal arguments have been
heard and not in limine.”<o:p></o:p>The
test laid down by the court was that the objection founded on allegations of
bias and judicial impropriety should not be made in limine but rather after the
hearing had been concluded. The Supreme Court dismissed the objection and
ordered the substantive action be heard on the merits.<o:p></o:p>The
decision of the Supreme Court in Bilson v Apaloo (supra) stands in sharp
conflict with the English case entitled R v Williams, ex parte Philips [1914] 1
KB 608. In that case Channell J stated the law as follows:-<o:p></o:p>“The Court</main>