DWOKOTO STOOL AND ANOTHER vs. KWAMANG STOOL AND OTHERS [1992]DLSC4233

Date	1992-11-17
Suit No.
Citation No.	[1992]DLSC4233

ADADE JSC

AMUA-SEKYI JSC

AIKINS JSC

BAMFORD-ADDO JSC

HAYFRON-BENJAMIN JSC

K MENSAH-BONSU (FOR DA ROCHA) FOR THE APPLICANTS.

K OFOSU-ASANTE FOR THE RESPONDENTS.

[1992]DLSC4233
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													<main id="main" class="content" style="min-height: 60rem" >DWOKOTO STOOL AND
ANOTHER<o:p></o:p>vs.<o:p></o:p>KWAMANG STOOL AND OTHERS<o:p></o:p>[SUPREME
COURT, ACCRA]<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in">

[1993 - 4] 1 GBR 317 - 321 C A&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;DATE: 17 NOVEMBER 1992<o:p></o:p>

</div>COUNSEL:<o:p></o:p>K
MENSAH-BONSU (FOR DA ROCHA) FOR THE APPLICANTS.<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in">

K
OFOSU-ASANTE FOR THE RESPONDENTS.<o:p></o:p>

</div>CORAM:<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in">

ADADE
JSC, AMUA-SEKYI JSC, AIKINS JSC, BAMFORD-ADDO JSC, HAYFRON-BENJAMIN JSC<o:p></o:p>

</div>ADADE
JSC. I have some difficulty agreeing with the interpretation of s 22(6) of the
Interpretation Act 1960 (CA 4) especially in relation to s 23 of the same Act.
In Hungarotex v Boateng [1987-88] 1 GLR 205, I sufficiently articulated these
misgivings in a minority opinion. The said s 22 and s 23 read as follows:<o:p></o:p>“22 (1) References in an
enactment to time are to Greenwich meantime.<o:p></o:p>(2) Where in an enactment
a period of time is expressed to begin on a particular day, that day shall be
included in the period.<o:p></o:p>(3) Where in an enactment
a period of time is expressed to be reckoned from, or after, a particular day,
that day shall not be included in the period.<o:p></o:p>(4) Where in an enactment
a period of time is expressed to end on, or be reckoned to a particular day,
that day shall be included in the period.<o:p></o:p>(5) Where the time limited
by an enactment for the doing of anything expires on a Sunday or a public
holiday, the time so limited shall extend to and the thing may be done on the
first following day that is not a Sunday or a public holiday.<o:p></o:p>(6) Subsection (2) to (5)
of this section apply in relation to a period expressed in days whether or not
the number of days is expressed to be clear days.<o:p></o:p>(7) Where in an enactment
anything is required to be done on a particular day, then, if that day happens
to fall on a Sunday or public holiday, the thing shall be considered as duly
done if it is done on the first following day that is not a Sunday or public
holiday.<o:p></o:p>23(1) In an enactment “month” means a
calendar month, that is to say, a month reckoned according to the calendar.<o:p></o:p>(2) If the period indicated in the
enactment begins on any date other than the first day of any of the twelve
months of the calendar it is to be reckoned from the date on which it is to
begin to the date in the next month numerically corresponding, less one, or, if
there is no corresponding date, to the last day of that month.<o:p></o:p>For example: a month beginning on 15th
January ends on 14th February; a month beginning on 31st January ends on 28th
February (or 29th February in a leap year).<o:p></o:p>(3) If the indicated period is one of
two, three or more months, it is to be reckoned from the date on which it is to
begin to the date numerically corresponding, less one, in the second, third, or
other successive month thereafter or, if there is no such corresponding date,
to the last day of the latter month.<o:p></o:p>For example: a period of six months
beginning on 15th August ends on 14th February; a period of six months
beginning on 30th or 31st August ends on 28th February (or 29th February in a
leap year).<o:p></o:p>(4) In an enactment “year” means a
period of twelve months.”<o:p></o:p>It
strikes me that when in a statute a period of time is expressed in days (e.g. 7
days, 21 days, etc.) s 22 applies. But when the period is expressed in months,
s 22 no longer applies; the relevant section is s 23. In the instant
application the period is expressed in months (3 months in the first instance
plus a grace period of 3 months). The total period of 6 months from the date of
judgment 18/12/91, calculated with the help of section 23 of CA 4 should expire
on 17/6/92, and not 18/6/92. The application for extension, filed on 18/6/92
would therefore seem to be out of time.<o:p></o:p>My
brother judges, however, hold a different view, as they did in the Hungarotex
case. I respect their view, and on this occasion I do not wish to carry my
doubts into another dissent. I accordingly agree that the application be
allowed, as prayed.<o:p></o:p>AMUA-SEKYI
JSC. By the decisions of this court in Hungarotex Foreign Trading Co v Boateng
[1987-88] 1 GLR 205 the application for an extension of time within which to
appeal was filed on the last permissible date. The reasons for the delay having
been satisfactorily explained, I am of the view that an extension of time ought
to be granted. I also grant leave to appeal as prayed.<o:p></o:p>AIKINS
JSC. In view of the decision of this court in Hungarotex Foreign Trading Co v
Boateng [1987-88] 1 GLR 205 I also agree that the application for extension of
time was filed within time and should be granted. I therefore grant leave as
prayed.<o:p></o:p>BAMFORD-ADDO
JSC. I have had the benefit of reading the ruling on this matter of the learned
President of this panel as well as those of my esteemed brothers, Amua-Sekyi
and Hayfron-Benjamin, both JSC. I am in total agreement with the latter’s
comments on Hungarotex Foreign Trading Co v Boateng [1987-88] 1 GLR 205</main>