[1992]DLSC4976 Login to Read Full Case <span style="font-size: 18px !important;"><p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;line-height:115%"><b><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height: 115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif";color:#00B0F0">REPUBLIC<o:p></o:p></span></b></p><p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;line-height:115%"><b><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height: 115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif";color:#00B0F0">vs.<o:p></o:p></span></b></p><p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;line-height:115%"><b><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height: 115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif";color:#00B0F0">HIGH COURT, ACCRA AND ANOTHER EX PARTE DARKE XII AND ANOTHER (NO 2)<o:p></o:p></span></b></p><p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;line-height:115%"><span style="font-size:10.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif"">[SUPREME COURT, ACCRA]<o:p></o:p></span></p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in"> <p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;line-height:115%; border:none;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0in; mso-padding-alt:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in"><span style="font-size:10.0pt;line-height: 115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif"">[1992 – 1993] 3 G B R 1230 – 1263 S C. DATE: 17 NOVEMBER 1992<o:p></o:p></span></p> </div><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify;line-height:115%"><b><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height: 115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif"">COUNSEL:<o:p></o:p></span></b></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify;line-height:115%"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif"">S KWAMI TETTEH FOR THE APPLICANTS.<o:p></o:p></span></p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in"> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify;line-height:115%;border:none; mso-border-bottom-alt:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0in;mso-padding-alt:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif"">B J DA ROCHA (WITH HIM ERIC GYAMSON) FOR THE RESPONDENTS.<o:p></o:p></span></p> </div><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify;line-height:115%"><b><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height: 115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif"">CORAM:<o:p></o:p></span></b></p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in"> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify;line-height:115%;border:none; mso-border-bottom-alt:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0in;mso-padding-alt:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif"">ADADE JSC, AMUA-SEKYI JSC, OSEI-HWERE JSC, AIKINS JSC, WIREDU JSC, HAYFRON-BENJAMIN JSC, AMUAH JA, KPEGAH JA, BROBBEY JA<o:p></o:p></span></p> </div><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify;line-height:115%"><b><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height: 115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif"">ADADE JSC. <o:p></o:p></span></b></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify;line-height:115%"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif"">On 20/10/92 we dismissed this application for review, but reserved the reasons for today. This court has, time and again, in a number of rulings, tried to explain the circumstances in which the court will entertain applications for review. It seems we have not yet succeeded in getting litigants to appreciate that a review is not a matter of course. As I see it, a decision by this court, once given, will, as a rule, not be changed. However, to every rule there is an exception, so goes the saying. A party must have to make an exceptional case if he is to succeed in an application for review. Everything apart, that exceptional case must convince the court that there has been a miscarriage of justice. The decision we gave on the 30/3/92 was to the effect that:<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;line-height:115%"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif"">(a) the judgment of the High Court presided over by Omari-Sasu J, dated 22/2/89 and of the Court of Appeal dated 19/7/90 confirming it, are null and void;<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;line-height:115%"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif"">(b) the decision of the High Court presided over by Francois J, dated 11/11/75 and of the Court of Appeal dated 30/7/79, are also null and void for want of jurisdiction on the ground that,<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;line-height:115%"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif"">(c) the matter before the High Court presided over by Francois J was a stool land boundaries settlement issue, and was cognisable only by the Stool Lands Boundaries Settlement Commission, to which it ought to have been referred. We accordingly referred it to that Commission, via the Attorney-General.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify;line-height:115%"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif"">Each of these decisions was a split decision, in each case by a majority of 4 to 3. It is not necessary to state which justices were in which camp in relation to which decision; the decisions remained the decision of the original court. For this review, two new justices have been added to the panel of seven judges. Their presence has not had any effect on the decision of 30/3/92, as both are of the opinion that the decision by Francois J is void.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify;line-height:115%"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif"">It must be pointed out that the matter had come before this court in the first place as a result of an application for certiorari to quash the decisions recited in (a) above only. It is said in the instant application for review that we should have stopped with the decision on (a) supra, and not proceeded to decide (b) and (c). This may well be so. But if indeed the matter before Francois J was basically a stool lands boundaries issue, then Francois J would not have had jurisdiction, and his decision, as that of the Court of Appeal arising from it, would be void. This court, on becoming aware of it, could, on its own motion, set it aside. The foundation for the decision of the Court of Appeal dated 30/7/79 would have collapsed, and setting aside that decision would be a mere formality. Having set aside all the decisions in the case from Francois J delivered in 1975, and of the Court of Appeal dated 1990, it appeared that there was nothing before any court to refer to the Stool Lands Boundaries Settlement Commission, thus making the decision in (c) above, on the face of it, not easy to defend. It would seem that it might have been better to have sent the case back to the High Court for the High Court of take appropriate measures. However, this court sitting in an appellate or supervisory capacity, may exercise any powers which a court from which a particular case has come, could have exercised. Accordingly, referring the matter ourselves rather than sending it down for the High Court to discharge the same function, cannot be said to have occasioned a miscarriage of justice. On the contrary, it has saved costs and cut down on delays. I do not see that the applicants have made an exceptional case for a review. That is why I held the view that notwithstanding the fact that each of the decisions above was a split decision, the application could not, on principle succeed.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify;line-height:115%"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif""><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify;line-height:115%"><b><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height: 115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif"">AMUA-SEKYI JSC. <o:p></o:p></span></b></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify;line-height:115%"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif"">The decision of the court that the dispute between the Peki and Tsito stools be referred to the Stool Lands Boundaries Settlement Commissioner for adjudication was fair. After all, it was the Tsito stool which, in the earlier proceedings, had argued that Francois J had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. That the objection was overruled does not, in my view, give it an excuse to seek to benefit from the wrongful assumption of jurisdiction by the High Court and the Court of Appeal.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify;line-height:115%"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif"">Counsel defends his position by arguing that as on 30 July 1979, the Court of Appeal was the highest court of the land and its decision cannot be challenged. If counsel is right, then a void judgment of the highest court of the land can never be set aside.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify;line-height:115%"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif"">Counsel was being less than honest with himself when he submitted that by granting his application to set aside the later judgments I had “preserved” the earlier ones on which his clients relied and brought [them] under protection of the court. As counsel well knows, in determining whether a court had jurisdiction to deal with a case and deliver a judgment the question whether the judgment as delivered was sound is irrelevant. In Republic v High Court, Accra ex parte Laryea [1989-90] 2 GLR 99, this court put it thus:<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;line-height:115%"><i><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height: 115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif"">“By jurisdiction is meant, of course, the power or authority of the court or judge to give a decision on the issue before it; and, in this regard the correctness or otherwise of the decision is irrelevant: for, if there is no jurisdiction, the decision will be quashed although it be right.”<o:p></o:p></span></i></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify;line-height:115%"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif"">Far from such a position being self-contradictory or ambivalent, it is what the law requires as, indeed, happened in Anane v Efriyea (1940) 6 WACA 169. In that case, the defendant, in an action in the court of the Chief Commissioner for Ashanti, ra