<p class="mb-5" id="contentDlCitation" hidden>[1992]DLSC5048</p> <div class="restriction-wrapper"> <div class="container-lg"> <div class="row"> <div class="col-md-12 restricted-content"> <div class="restricted-content-img-wrapper"> <div class="lock-icon bounce-7"> <img class="" src="https://www.dennislawgh.com/dl-assets/dl-images/lock-content.png" alt="Subscription based content"> </div> </div> <a href="https://www.dennislawgh.com/login" class="btn btn-primary btn-lg" style="font-family: 'open sans'; text-transform: capitalize; border-radius: 8px"> Login to Read Full Case </a> </div> </div> </div> </div> <main id="main" class="content" style="min-height: 60rem" ><span style="font-size: 18px !important;"><p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;line-height:115%"><b><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height: 115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif";color:#00B0F0">REPUBLIC<o:p></o:p></span></b></p><p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;line-height:115%"><b><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height: 115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif";color:#00B0F0">vs.<o:p></o:p></span></b></p><p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;line-height:115%"><b><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height: 115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif";color:#00B0F0">HIGH COURT, KUMASI EX PARTE KHOURY<o:p></o:p></span></b></p><p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;line-height:115%"><span style="font-size:10.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif"">[SUPREME COURT, ACCRA]<o:p></o:p></span></p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in"> <p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;line-height:115%; border:none;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0in; mso-padding-alt:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in"><span style="font-size:10.0pt;line-height: 115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif"">[1992 – 1993] 4 G B R 1565 - 1577 C.A DATE: 23 JUNE 1992<o:p></o:p></span></p> </div><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify;line-height:115%"><b><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height: 115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif"">COUNSEL:<o:p></o:p></span></b></p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in"> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify;line-height:115%;border:none; mso-border-bottom-alt:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0in;mso-padding-alt:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif"">AHENKORAH (WITH HIM MRS QUAYSON) FOR THE APPLICANT.<o:p></o:p></span></p> </div><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify;line-height:115%"><b><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height: 115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif"">CORAM:<o:p></o:p></span></b></p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in"> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify;line-height:115%;border:none; mso-border-bottom-alt:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0in;mso-padding-alt:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif"">ADADE JSC, FRANCOIS JSC, WUAKU JSC, AMUA-SEKYI JSC, OSEI-HWERE JSC, WIREDU JSC, BAMFORD-ADDO JSC<o:p></o:p></span></p> </div><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify;line-height:115%"><b><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height: 115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif"">ADADE JSC. <o:p></o:p></span></b></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify;line-height:115%"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif"">This is an application inviting us to review our decision in Rep v High Court Kumasi ex parte Khoury [1991] 2 GLR 393 given on 22 July 1991. By that decision, this court by a majority of 3 to 2, Adade and Amua-Sekyi JJSC dissenting, quashed: (a) a notice of appeal pending before the Court of Appeal and (b) an order by the High Court staying execution of a judgment given by it on 22 June 1990. These orders were made in favour of the plaintiff who had applied to the court for: (a) an order to declare, and set aside as null and void, a notice of appeal to the Court of Appeal filed by the respondent on 12 September 1990 in the High Court, Kumasi in Khoury v Lawson and for (b) certiorari to quash as a nullity the entire proceedings relating to the application dated 26 October 1990 for stay of execution of the High Court, Kumasi coram: Lartey J in that case and the order dated 22 June 1990 staying execution of the judgment of the court.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify;line-height:115%"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif"">The defendant lost a substantive case in the district court on 6 September 1989, and lost on appeal to the High Court on 22 June 1990. The High Court decision of 22 June 1990 was a final decision, not an interlocutory decision, and by rule 10(1) of Court of Appeal Rules 1962 (LI 218) (as amended by the Court of Appeal (Amendment) Rules 1969 (LI 618)), the defendant would normally have had three months in which to appeal as of right, but for section 2 of the Courts (Amendment) Law 1987 (PNDCL 191) which required him to seek leave. The time limit of 14 days in r 10(1) of LI 218 relates to “appeals against interlocutory decisions” not to applications for leave to do anything.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify;line-height:115%"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif"">On 29 August 1990 the High Court dismissed an application for extension of time in which to apply for leave under PNDCL 191 on the ground that it had no jurisdiction to extend time. This decision was clearly interlocutory and was at the defendant’s choice, appealable as of right within 14 days. He could have repeated the application in the Court of Appeal, but he decided, as he was entitled to do, to appeal instead. He filed his notice of appeal on 12/9/90. By section 22 of the Interpretation Act 1960 (CA 4) this notice was filed on the 14th day from the date of the decision of 29/8/90 (see r 10(2) LI 218) and was timeous. The appeal was therefore properly before the Court of Appeal, which was competent to deal with it.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify;line-height:115%"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif"">The case has brought us face to face with a number of interesting issues which I would like to mention for the record, even if I do not intend to decide them, seeing that the occasion is not opportune, these proceedings being an application for review.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify;line-height:115%"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif"">The case has exposed a serious lacuna in our rules of practice, and it appears that as early as possible the Rules Committee ought to formulate rules for the exercise of our supervisory jurisdiction.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify;line-height:115%"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif"">It is contended that the relevant provision under the 1979 Constitution endowing us with supervisory jurisdiction contains two separate and distinct powers namely (a) general powers of supervision and (b) special powers relating to the prerogative writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and quo warranto. It is said that the application in respect of the notice of appeal in this case was brought under the general powers of supervision in article 119 of the 1979 Constitution, ie the court’s general supervisory powers, implying that under those powers a party to a case in any court may bring anything at all for our scrutiny. I am worried at this development, as it entitles this court to reach out into any registry and deal with any process lying there. It is a situation we must feel concerned about. See, for example, the use to which certiorari was put in Rep v Court of Appeal ex parte Sidi [1987-88] 2 GLR 170, SC. Are we not risking opening up too may avenues for the abuse of this remedy?<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify;line-height:115%"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif"">I would have thought that given the facts of this case, the supervisory jurisdiction of the court would be excercisable over a judicial action of the court below, not otherwise. By our decision of 22 July 1991 in Rep v High Court Kumasi ex parte Khoury [1991] 2 GLR 393, we have decreed that a notice of appeal properly filed by a party to a case, and which has not been seen by any of the judges of the Court of Appeal, let alone pronounced upon by them, is a proper subject for the exercise of this court’s supervisory jurisdiction. In such a situation, who is this court really supervising? It cannot be the High Court judge, because he has had nothing to do with the notice of appeal. It cannot be the registrar of the High Court either, because he was merely discharging an administrative duty of accepting a document for filing; it is not his business to pronounce upon the validity or otherwise of the document. It cannot be the Court of Appeal because that court has done nothing; the notice was going to the learned Justices of Appeal to be dealt with; it never reached them. We have been inveigled into taking over this notice and dealing with it, thus usurping the power of the Court of Appeal, and pre-empting whatever decision it would have given in the appeal. I am convinced that we have no jurisdiction to substitute ourselves for the Court of Appeal in such manner. Sooner or later we may find ourselves taking up cases from the High Court too. We are laying down this principle after due deliberation, knowing it will be relied upon in future as a precedent. I can very well see a party bringing up, on certiorari, a writ of summons from the registry of the High Court to be quashed, on the ground that it discloses no cause of action, or even that it is statute-barred. Would this strictly be a matter for our supervisory jurisdiction? Yet we must be prepared to deal with such an application, following the precedent we are setting in this case.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify;line-height:115%"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif"">I know that by statute this court is not bound by its own previous decisions. See article 116(3) of the 1979 Constitution, now article 129(3) of the 1992 Constitution. But too frequent a recourse to this liberty to avoid a previous decision would deprive our pronouncements of respect, certainty and authority.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify;line-height:115%"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif"">On the issue of law raised in this matter, our attention has been drawn to this court’s decision in Patu-Styles v Amoo-Lamptey [1984-86] 2 GLR 644, SC to support the contention that applications for leave to appeal must be made within 14 days of the decision sought to be appealed against, and that time cannot be extended. Amoo Lamptey was applied in Darke v Darke [1984-86] 1 GLR 481, SC and in Khoury v Mitchual [1989-90] 1 GLR 161, CA. I must observe at once that reliance on Amoo-Lamptey is, with respect, completely misguided, arising out of a misreading or a mi</main>
