OPAREBEA vs. MENSAH [1993]DLCA819

Date	1993-12-16
Suit No.
Citation No.	[1993]DLCA819

LAMPTEY JA

ADJABENG JA

LUTTERODT JA

DR DANIELS FOR THE APPELLANT.

DR TWUM FOR THE RESPONDENT.

[1993]DLCA819
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													<main id="main" class="content" style="min-height: 60rem" ><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:&quot;Book Antiqua&quot;,&quot;serif&quot;;
mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Book Antiqua&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Book Antiqua&quot;;
color:#00B0F0">OPAREBEA<o:p></o:p><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:&quot;Book Antiqua&quot;,&quot;serif&quot;;
mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Book Antiqua&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Book Antiqua&quot;;
color:#00B0F0">vs.<o:p></o:p><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:&quot;Book Antiqua&quot;,&quot;serif&quot;;
mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Book Antiqua&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Book Antiqua&quot;;
color:#00B0F0">MENSAH<o:p></o:p>[COURT OF APPEAL, ACCRA]<o:p></o:p>[1993-94] 1 GLR 61<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in">

<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="margin-bottom:5.0pt;text-align:right;
mso-pagination:none;border:none;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in;mso-padding-alt:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in">Date: 16
December 1993<o:p></o:p>

</div>COUNSEL:<o:p></o:p>DR DANIELS FOR THE APPELLANT.<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in">

DR TWUM FOR THE RESPONDENT. <o:p></o:p>

LAMPTEY, ADJABENG AND LUTTERODT JJA<o:p></o:p>

</div>JUDGMENT OF LUTTERODT JA.<o:p></o:p>In 1958 the petitioner-cross appellant (hereinafter referred to as
the appellant) got married to the original respondent, one S A Mensah, now
deceased, in accordance with customary law. Following a breakdown of their
marriage, she instituted proceedings in the High Court, Accra for a number of
reliefs including the following:<o:p></o:p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt;
margin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;mso-pagination:none;border:none;mso-padding-alt:
31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt;mso-border-shadow:yes">“(2) That the petitioner be granted maintenance pending suit and
financial provision. <o:p></o:p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt;
margin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;mso-pagination:none;border:none;mso-padding-alt:
31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt;mso-border-shadow:yes">(3) That it be declared that the petitioner has a beneficial
interest in the family assets.”<o:p></o:p>By a judgment dated 14 December 1984, the learned trial judge
ordered, among other things, as follows:<o:p></o:p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt;
margin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;mso-pagination:none;border:none;mso-padding-alt:
31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt;mso-border-shadow:yes">“For the petitioner’s matrimonial reliefs concerning financial
provision and beneficial interest in the respondent’s assets, it is hereby
ordered that the petitioner be given the respondent’s house at Tesano where the
petitioner resides and has already staked her interests by making extensions
thereto.”<o:p></o:p>The respondent who was not at all happy with this order in
particular caused his solicitors to appeal against the decision. The appellant
in turn has appealed and prayed for a variation of the order by “increasing the
amount of financial provision in conformity with the reliefs claimed before the
High Court.”<o:p></o:p>In the course of these proceedings the respondent died and his
executors were, in conformity with the rules, substituted as defendants. They
however withdrew the appeal they had lodged, leaving the cross-appeal to be
determined.<o:p></o:p>We would notice that although the appellant sought for these two
distinct reliefs I have already referred to, (1) financial provision; and (2) a
declaration that she has a beneficial interest in the family assets, the court
did not grant these reliefs separately. What the learned judge did was to lump
the two together and declare the Tesano house adequate for both reliefs. This
the court did, after reviewing the evidence and concluding that she is not only
entitled to financial provision but she indeed has a beneficial interest in the
“respondent’s assets.”<o:p></o:p>It seems to me that the learned judge drew his authority from
section 20(1) of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1971 (Act 367) which reads:<o:p></o:p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt;
margin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;mso-pagination:none;border:none;mso-padding-alt:
31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt;mso-border-shadow:yes">“20 (1) The court may order either party to the marriage to pay to
the other part such sum of money or convey to the other party such movable or immovable
property as settlement of property rights or in lieu thereof or as part of
financial provision as the court thinks just and equitable.”<o:p></o:p>The appellant is not challenging the validity of the order. Her
main complaint, I think, is that the quantum is grossly inadequate. Indeed, I
do think that section 20(1) of Act 367 empowers a judge to make any of the
orders specified therein where the spouse is not merely praying for financial
provision but is alleging an interest in property. In other words, section
20(1) of Act 367 provides for two basic reliefs: (1) settlement of property
rights arising from claims of substantial contribution either in money or
money’s worth; and (2) financial provision. Achiampong v Achiampong [1982-83]
GLR 1017, CA, see particularly the speech of Abban JA (as he then was),
supports the views I have expressed.<o:p></o:p>I have taken the t</main>