REPUBLIC vs. HIGH COURT, KUMASI; EX PARTE ACKAAH [1994]DLSC611

Date	1994-07-26
Suit No.
Citation No.	[1994]DLSC611

ABBAN JSC

AMUA-SEKYI JSC

BAMFORD-ADDO JSC

CHARLES HAYFRON-BENJAMIN JSC

AMPIAH JSC

BODZA LUMOR (WITH HIM PHILIP NKRUMAH) FOR THE PLAINTIFF-APPLICANT.

FRIMPONG-BUADU FOR THE DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.

[1994]DLSC611
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													<main id="main" class="content" style="min-height: 60rem" ><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:&quot;Book Antiqua&quot;,&quot;serif&quot;;
mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Book Antiqua&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Book Antiqua&quot;;
color:#00B0F0">REPUBLIC<o:p></o:p><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:&quot;Book Antiqua&quot;,&quot;serif&quot;;
mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Book Antiqua&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Book Antiqua&quot;;
color:#00B0F0">vs.<o:p></o:p><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:&quot;Book Antiqua&quot;,&quot;serif&quot;;
mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Book Antiqua&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Book Antiqua&quot;;
color:#00B0F0">HIGH COURT, KUMASI; EX PARTE ACKAAH<o:p></o:p>[SUPREME COURT, ACCRA]<o:p></o:p>[1995-96] 1 GLR 270<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in">

</div>COUNSEL:<o:p></o:p>BODZA LUMOR (WITH HIM PHILIP NKRUMAH) FOR THE PLAINTIFF-APPLICANT.<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in">

FRIMPONG-BUADU FOR THE
DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT. <o:p></o:p>

ABBAN, AMUA-SEKYI,
BAMFORD-ADDO, CHARLES HAYFRON-BENJAMIN AND AMPIAH JJSC<o:p></o:p>

</div>JUDGMENT OF AMUA-SEKYI JSC<o:p></o:p>Delivered the judgment of the court. In the colonial period and
the years immediately after independence, our court structure was governed by
the Courts Ordinance, Cap 4 (1951 Rev), section 22(1) of which gave the Chief
Justice power to form territorial judicial divisions in the High Court. It
reads:<o:p></o:p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt;
margin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;mso-pagination:none;border:none;mso-padding-alt:
31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt;mso-border-shadow:yes">“22. (1) For the purposes of the administration of justice, the
Chief Justice, with the approval of the Governor, may by order under his hand
provide for the formation of Judicial Divisions . . . and from time to time may
in like manner amend, vary, alter or revoke any such order.”<o:p></o:p>It was further explained in section 22 (2) of Cap 4 that the
judicial divisions were to be separate and distinct from any districts formed
by the Governor for administrative purposes and did not need to conform with
the boundaries or descriptions of such districts. As to the dispatch of
business in the judicial divisions so created, section 23(1) of Cap 4 provided
as follows:<o:p></o:p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt;
margin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;mso-pagination:none;border:none;mso-padding-alt:
31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt;mso-border-shadow:yes">“23 (1) With a view to the more convenient distribution of the
business of the [High] Court, the Chief Justice may assign any Puisne Judge or
Puisne Judges to any particular Judicial Division or Divisions . . . for the
purpose of exercising jurisdiction therein.”<o:p></o:p>And it was further explained in section 23 (2) of Cap 4 that a
puisne judge who had been assigned to a particular judicial division or
divisions might, so long as he remained so assigned, continue to exercise
elsewhere within the then Gold Coast the powers and jurisdiction of a judge of
such judicial division or divisions even when he was temporarily absent
therefrom.<o:p></o:p>The view that the judicial divisions formed by the Chief Justice
under these provisions were autonomous entities, and that the puisne judges
assigned to them could not lawfully exercise jurisdiction over other such
divisions gained support from the decision in R v Colvin; R v Arthur (1957) 3
WALR 89, where it was held that a contempt of a Divisional Court in the Ashanti
Judicial Division could not be tried in the Eastern Judicial Division. But, as
Wiredu v Mim Timber Co Ltd [1963] 2 GLR 167, SC reminds us, these judicial
divisions were formed “for the purposes of the administration of justice”, and
the assignment of particular puisne judges to them was “with a view to the more
convenient distribution of the business of the High Court” only. In that case,
it was urged upon the erstwhile Supreme Court that a concession inquiry held in
the Land Court in the Ashanti Judicial Division was invalid as the land lay
within the boundaries of the Brong-Ahafo Judicial Division. In a unanimous
decision, the court comprising Adumua-Bossman, Ollennu and Blay JJSC said per
Ollennu JSC at 172:<o:p></o:p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt;
margin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;mso-pagination:none;border:none;mso-padding-alt:
31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt;mso-border-shadow:yes">“The High Court under the Courts Ordinance, . . . was just one
High Court exercising jurisdiction throughout the land. It was only with a view
to more convenient administration of justice that the country was divided into
judicial divisions, see section 22(1) of the Courts Ordinance, not for purposes
that the jurisdiction of the High Court should be strictly limited to the
judicial division in which it was situated, and be completely void of
jurisdiction in matters arising in or concerned with land in any other judicial
division. Therefore unless a party to proceedings before the court, or the
judge himself raised objection to the trial in a judicial division of a cause or
matter which could properly have been instituted in another judicial division,
the trial of any such cause in a judicial division in which it was commenced,
is a valid trial, see Order 5, rule 1 (a) and (e).”<o:p></o:p>Relying on the statutory provisions and the rules of procedure of
the High Court, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of the concession inquiry
on the ground that no objection had been taken to the exercise of jurisdiction
by the Land Court in Kumasi.<o:p></o:p>The Courts Act, 1960 (CA 9) repealed Cap 4. Divisional Courts were
abolished, as were th</main>