NASIB DAHABIEH vs. S. A. TARQUI & BROTHERS [2002]DLSC2380

Date	2002-05-29
Suit No.	CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8/2001
Citation No.	[2002]DLSC2380

BAMFORD-ADDO (MRS) J.S.C. (PRESIDING)

AMPIAH J.S.C

KPEGAH J.S.C

ADJABENG J.S.C

ADZOE J.S.C.

MR. AMARKAI AMATEIFIO FOR THE APPLICANT.

MR. KIZITO BEYUO FOR THE RESPONDENT.

[2002]DLSC2380
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													<main id="main" class="content" style="min-height: 60rem" >NASIB DAHABIEH<o:p></o:p>vs.<o:p></o:p>S. A. TARQUI &amp; BROTHERS<o:p></o:p>[SUPREME
COURT]<o:p></o:p>CIVIL
APPEAL NO. 8/2001<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in">

DATE:
29TH MAY, 2002.<o:p></o:p>

</div>COUNSEL<o:p></o:p>MR.
AMARKAI AMATEIFIO FOR THE APPLICANT.<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in">

MR.
KIZITO BEYUO FOR THE RESPONDENT.<o:p></o:p>

</div>CORAM:&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in">

BAMFORD-ADDO
(MRS), J.S.C. (PRESIDING), AMPIAH, J.S.C., KPEGAH J.S.C., ADJABENG, J.S.C.,
ADZOE, J.S.C.<o:p></o:p>

</div><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>JUDGMENT<o:p></o:p>T.
K. ADZOE, J.S.C.:<o:p></o:p>This
is an appeal from the judgment of the Court of Appeal dated 29/6/ 2000. It was
a decision which reversed the trial High Court's judgment in favour of the plaintiff/respondent/appellant
whom we shall hereafter refer to simply as the appellant. The
defendants/appellants/respondents will similarly be referred to as the
respondents simpliciter.<o:p></o:p>The
appellant filed and argued four grounds of appeal — two original grounds plus
two additional grounds. They are that:<o:p></o:p>(1) The judgment is wrong in law;<o:p></o:p>(2) The judgment is against the weight
of evidence;<o:p></o:p>(3) The learned justices erred in
granting the order of recovery of possession in the absence of evidence that
the landlord had served the requisite statutory notice on the tenant which
notice is a condition precedent to taking any action based on the said breach;<o:p></o:p>(4) In view of the substantial works
on the premises in the nature of renovations, the learned justices ought to
have suspended the order for recovery of possession in the interest of justice.<o:p></o:p>The
grounds (1) and (3) above deserve some comment. Rule 6 (4) of the Supreme Court
Rules, 1996, C.I. 16 requires that " where a ground of appeal is one of
law the appellant shall indicate the stage of the proceedings at which it was
first raised". Ground (3) is expressed as a ground of law and the
appellant ought to have indicated whether he had raised it before now, or
whether he is now raising it for the first time. The significance of this
requirement will be seen later in this judgment.<o:p></o:p>Similarly,
when the appellant alleged in ground (1) that the judgment is wrong in law it
seems that he is in effect saying that there is an error of law in the
judgment; we believe that was what he intended to say. Indeed that ground of
appeal appears to have been directed at the Court of Appeal's holding that the
appellant was estopped per rem judicatam from instituting the action because
the appellant's submission on that ground is that " the instant case was
not properly within the realm of estoppel per rem judicatam and the Court of
Appeal misapplied the doctrine". In that regard too the appellant again
ought to have indicated in the said ground (1) the fact that the decision as to
the estoppel was what he was attacking as having rendered the judgment wrong in
law. If that holding amounted to an error in law, then rule 6 (2) requires the
appellant to specify it in the ground of appeal as the subject of this
particular complaint — [see rule 6 (2)(f) of C.I. 16].<o:p></o:p>We
think that having regard to Rule 6, grounds (1) and (3) set out above do not
comply with the Rules. Clearly the intention behind rule 6 is to narrow the
issues on appeal and shorten the hearing; by specifying the error made by the
lower court or by disclosing whether or not a point at issue had earlier on
been raised, both the court and counsel for the respondent would be enabled to
concentrate on the relevant parts of the evidence in the record of proceedings
and not waste time on irrelevant parts of the evidence. With respect to
questions of law, it is necessary that the respondent and his lawyers know well
in advance what points of law are being raised so that they may prepare their
case and marshal their authorities, whiles an indication that the point of law
was or was not raised in the court below may help the court resolve the issue
faster.<o:p></o:p>In
Zabrama v. Segbedzi 2 GLR 221, the Court of Appeal held that a ground of appeal
alleging misdirection by the trial judge without specifying how he misdirected
himself rendered the ground of appeal admissible. Reading the judgment of the
court Kpegah, J.A., as he then was, referred to the rule which provided that
"No ground which is vague or general in terms ... shall be permitted",
and said at page 226 "The implication of these rules is that an appellant,
after specifying the part of the judgment or order complained of, must state
what he alleged ought to have been found by the trial judge, or what error he
had made in point of law. I do not think it meets the requirements of these
rules to simply allege "misdirection" on the part of the trial judge.
The requirement is that the grounds stated in the notice of appeal must clearly
and concisely indicate in what manner the trial judge misdirected himself
either on the law or on the facts. To state in a notice of appeal that
"the trial judge misdirected himself and gave an erroneous decision"
without specifying how he misdirected himself is against the rules and renders
such a ground of appeal inadmissible. The rationale is that a person who is
brought to an appellate forum to maintain or defend a verdict or decision which
he has got in his favour shall understand on what ground it is impugned".
The same rule applies in this court, and we think the Court of Appeal was
correct. In the circumstances we hereby dismiss ground (1) of the appeal. But
the only fault with ground (3) is that it has failed to state whether or not
the issue of non-compliance was raised before the trial court, and we feel that
this omission is not so fundamental as to infect ground (3); we will accept
ground (3) for argument.<o:p></o:p>In
order to properly appreciate the issues raised for determination in this
appeal, one must took at the history of the whole litigation. Nasib Dahabieh
and the Turqui brothers were aliens resident in Ghana in 1966. They all did
business and lived in Accra. Nasib traded under the name and style of
"Technical Trading Compa</main>