WILLIAM A. QUARCOO vs. MADAM JEMAA [2004]DLCA6771

Date	2004-07-23
Suit No.	H1/36/2004
Citation No.	[2004]DLCA6771

TWUMASI JA (PRESIDING)

ASARE KORANG JA

PIESARE JA

[2004]DLCA6771
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													<main id="main" class="content" style="min-height: 60rem" >WILLIAM A.
QUARCOO<o:p></o:p>(PLT/APPELT)<o:p></o:p>vs.<o:p></o:p>MADAM JEMAA<o:p></o:p>(DEFT/RESPT)<o:p></o:p>[COURT
OF APPEAL, ACCRA]<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in">

TWUMASI JA (PRESIDING), ASARE KORANG
JA, PIESARE JA<o:p></o:p>

</div><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in">

</div>TWUMASI,
JA <o:p></o:p>The
proceedings which culminated in this appeal originated from the Community
Tribunal Accra where the appellant, claiming to be the owner of a piece of land
prayed the court for orders against the respondent for recovery of possession
of the said land and ejectment therefrom. His ground for proceeding against the
respondent was that the respondent was a licencee who had refused or failed to
react positively to the appellant's call upon him to quit from the house. The
Community Tribunal gave judgment for the appellant. <o:p></o:p>On
appeal from the said court to the High Court, the judgment was overturned and
judgment was entered for the respondent. Against this judgment the appellant
has appealed on a number of grounds. Before the High Court certain clear facts
emerged and I wish to recapitulate them. The respondent first entered the land
thinking that it belonged to the Abossey Okai Stool. <o:p></o:p>Nevertheless
he never acquired specific grant from the said stool and he continued to be on
the land as a licencee. Thereafter the appellant also happened to enter the
land. Each of them claimed to have erected some structure on the land. <o:p></o:p>In
the aftermath of their entry into the land they came to learn that a fierce
litigation was raging between the Akumadjei Stool and the Abossey Okai Stool
over the ownership of the land. In fact both parties set themselves poised to
await the result of the litigation. <o:p></o:p>In
the result the Akumadjei Stool emerged victorious as the owner of the land. The
appellant took steps to acquire title to his land. He prepared a document
purporting to be an indenture to be presented to the stool for execution. The
document had not however been registered although it had been processed and
executed. It had also not been approved by the Lands Commission. In other words
the consent and concurrence of the said commission had not been obtained as
required by statute. <o:p></o:p>On
the other side of the litigation was the respondent who relied perilously upon
the bare long possession of the land. He had not armed himself with any
document of title. The first ground of appeal was the usual omnibus ground
namely the judgment was against the weight of evidence. Counsel argued that the
learned trial judge erred in that he misapprehended the real facts by assuming
that the parties derived their title through different stools whereas the true
facts were that they were both on common ground that they relied on the stool
which was soon to be declared owner of the land. It is conceded that the trial
judge made that error but in my view the error was not decisive and could be
ignored. The next important ground of appeal was whether the learned trial
judge was right in his view that the unregistered document was invalid. <o:p></o:p>In
the case of Odoi v. Hammond [1971] 1 GLR 375 the Court of appeal held in the
holding (2) of the report thus:— <o:p></o:p>"holding
(2) The deed purporting to confirm the plaintiff's customary grant was a
instrument registrable under the Land Registry Act 1962 (Act 122), because it
was in writing effecting land situate in Ghana. Since it was not registered, it
was void and of no effect." <o:p></o:p>The
learned trial judge was therefore right when he held that the unregistered
instrument in the hands of the appellant would not assist him because it was
invalid. Also in the case of Amuzu v. Oklika [1998-98] SCGLR P.141 at holding
(1) the following appears:— <o:p></o:p>"True,
the principle of registration has blurred the edge of the doctrine of notice
with respect to transfers of the legal estate in land. Nevertheless the
equitable doctrine of notice cannot be ignored by the courts in circumstances
in which the transaction is patently unjust." A court cannot ignore the
unconscionable conduct on the part of a subsequent purchaser even though he has
notice - actual, constructive or imputed of third party rights and interests in
the property he seeks to acquire." <o:p></o:p>Although
in the instant case, the relationship between the parties is not akin to that
of first purchaser and subsequent one the principle of equity stated in the
above case or the view of the Supreme Court is transferable. The appellant no
less than the Akumadjei Stool knew or must be deemed to have had constructive
notice of the prior possession or occupation of the land by the respondent. In
law a licencee has an interest in the land he occupies, if only because at
least he is entitled to a reasonable notice from the true owner of the land to
compel him to vacate the land concerned. The stool could not therefore make a
gra</main>