[2006]DLSC2426 Login to Read Full Case <span style="font-size: 18px !important;"><p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;line-height:115%"><b><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height: 115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif";color:#2E74B5;mso-themecolor:accent1; mso-themeshade:191">MARY TETTERLEY BILL & 5 ORS AND ROBERT ALEXANDER ATTUGUAYE COLLEY<o:p></o:p></span></b></p><p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;line-height:115%"><b><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height: 115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif";color:#2E74B5;mso-themecolor:accent1; mso-themeshade:191">vs.<o:p></o:p></span></b></p><p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;line-height:115%"><b><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height: 115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif";color:#2E74B5;mso-themecolor:accent1; mso-themeshade:191">EMMANUEL ABEKA BIL<o:p></o:p></span></b></p><p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;line-height:115%"><span style="font-size:10.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif"">[SUPREME COURT]<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;line-height:115%"><span style="font-size:10.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif"">CIVIL APPEAL NO.J4/7/2004<o:p></o:p></span></p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in"> <p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;line-height:115%; border:none;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0in; mso-padding-alt:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in"><span style="font-size:10.0pt;line-height: 115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif"">DATE: 28TH JUNE, 2006.<o:p></o:p></span></p> </div><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify;line-height:115%"><b><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height: 115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif"">COUNSEL:<o:p></o:p></span></b></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify;line-height:115%"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif"">NII AMPONSAH FOR APPELLANT.<o:p></o:p></span></p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in"> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify;line-height:115%;border:none; mso-border-bottom-alt:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0in;mso-padding-alt:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif"">ADUMUAH-BOSSMAN FOR RESPONDENT<o:p></o:p></span></p> </div><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify;line-height:115%"><b><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height: 115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif"">CORAM: <o:p></o:p></span></b></p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in"> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify;line-height:115%;border:none; mso-border-bottom-alt:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0in;mso-padding-alt:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif"">ATUGUBA, J.S.C. (PRESIDING), GEORGINA WOOD, J.S.C., PROF OCRAN, J.S.C., ANSAH, J.S.C., ANINAKWAH J.S.C.<o:p></o:p></span></p> </div><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify;line-height:115%"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif""><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;line-height:115%"><b><u><span style="font-size:12.0pt; line-height:115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif"">J U D G M EN T<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify;line-height:115%"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif""> ATUGUBA JSC delivered the judgment of the court. The plaintiffs-respondents-respondents (hereinafter referred to as the plaintiffs) sued the defendant-appellant-appellant (hereinafter referred to as the defendant and the co-plaintiff-respondent-respondent in the High Court, Accra in an estate matter in respect of which the latter two are the administrators, having been granted letters of administration.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify;line-height:115%"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif"">Owing to opposing attitudes by these administrators towards the suit, the High Court, upon the plaintiffs' application, struck out the co-plaintiff who was then the second defendant, and joined him in his current position, as the co-plaintiff. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify;line-height:115%"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif"">When trial opened, the plaintiffs called three witnesses. They testified. However, when the co-plaintiff was called by the plaintiffs as the fourth plaintiff witness, the defendant's counsel, Mr Nii Amponsah, upon his being sworn, raised an objection on the grounds that: first, having renounced administration he must act jointly with the defendant; and second, that he has not pleaded any facts upon which he could testify. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify;line-height:115%"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif"">This objection is rather puzzling. The co-plaintiff, as stated (supra) was called as "the fourth plaintiff witness" and was proceeding to testify in that capacity, and not as a co-plaintiff when counsel raised his objection. It is trite law that unless incompetent, a party can testify as a witness: see sections 58 and 59 of the Evidence Decree, 1973 (NRCD 323). No allegation of incompetence arising from those provisions is made against the co-plaintiff as a witness, to wit, the fourth plaintiff witness. That being so, objection could be taken if he purported to testify on matters that ought to have been pleaded by the plaintiffs but have not been pleaded. Even then, such objection could not be based on competence but on admissibility of evidence. That is not what transpired here. This suffices to dispose of this matter.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify;line-height:115%"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif"">However, as the issue of the competence of the capacity of the co-plaintiff has engaged arguments from counsel on both sides and the considerable attention of the Court of Appeal, it is better to deal with it. It is said that when the trial court granted the plaintiffs' application for the second defendant to be struck out from the suit as defendant and rather joined him as a co-plaintiff, no appeal was taken therefrom and that ought to conclude the issue. However, capacity being a fundamental issue, the plea of its forceclosure cannot prevail.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify;line-height:115%"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif"">It is trite law that no matter how a void order has come to the knowledge of a superior court, the same must be addressed. In Hayford v Moses [1980] GLR 757 at 761 Sarkodee J held as follows:<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;line-height:115%"><i><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height: 115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif""> "Mr Sekyi-Hughes, learned counsel for the defendant submitted that in as much as the parties are co-administrators the action against the defendant is not maintainable. As a general rule if there are several executors and administrators, they have a joint and entire interest in the estate of the testator or intestate which cannot be divided. Accordingly, they cannot maintain an action at law to protect the deceased's property against one another the reason being that a person cannot sue himself either alone or jointly with others: see Ellis v Kerr [1910] 1 Ch 529."<o:p></o:p></span></i></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify;line-height:115%"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif""> This principle is general but no absolute. In Acquaah v Larbi [1980] GLR 629 at 635-636, Edward Wiredu J (as he then was) said:<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;line-height:115%"><i><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height: 115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif""> "One thing which should be borne in mind in this action is that the defendant is a party to this action and has the right to challenge the capacity of the person seeking to bring to court. The plaintiff is not his landlord; he is a tenant of the estate of the deceased Koi Larbi whose legal representatives are three of whom the plaintiff is one. The common law position with regard to actions commenced by executors on behalf of an estate is that as plaintiffs all proving executors must join and those who refuse must be joined as defendants. If there are two or more executors, all those who are of full age and have proved the will should join as plaintiffs in an action: see Williams on Executors and Administrators (14th ed), para 1834 and Bullen & Leake's Precedents of Pleadings (11th ed), s 22 at p 203.<o:p></o:p></span></i></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;line-height:115%"><i><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height: 115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif"">With regard to non-joinder of one or two or more executors, Werderman v Societe General d'Electricite (1881) 19 Ch D 246 is an authority for the proposition that the only objection which a defendant could take is to take out a summons to have the others joined as plaintiffs. Where they refuse to join as plaintiffs the one suing should bring them in as defendants: see Gandy v Gandy (1885) 30 Ch D 57, CA. Had the position been that the plaintiff had sued alone as an executor one would not have taken the defendant's objection seriously."<o:p></o:p></span></i></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify;line-height:115%"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif""> Indeed, the contention that administrators must necessarily act together and on the same side as parties to an action in all situations whatever practical and serious problems may be entailed thereby appears so irrational that as a common law rule it cannot hold sway. The maxim cessat ratione cessat lex ipsa would control such an absurdity. Even statutes are construed, as is well-known, to avoid absurdity, inconvenience, etc where possible. It is not surprising therefore that In re Moore (1888) P 36 where an executor had, before probate and without the assent of his co-executor, intermeddled in the estate and made preparations to dispose of a portion of it, the court gave leave to the co-executor to issue a writ against him claiming an injunction to restrain him from dealing with the estate before probate and praying for the appointment of a receiver.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify;line-height:1