MRS. ELIZABETH ANOKYE vs. MRS MARGARET OSEI AND 8 0THERS [2008]DLSC6746

Date	2008-03-05
Suit No.	CIVIL MOTION NO J8/2/2007
Citation No.	[2008]DLSC6746

MRS. WOOD C.J. (PRESIDING)

BROBBEY J.S.C.

ANSAH J.S.C.

MRS. ADINYIRA J.S.C.

ASIAMAH J.S.C.

EDWARD ANOKYE FOR THE APPLICANT.

PAAPA DADSON FOR THE RESPONDENT.

[2008]DLSC6746
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													<main id="main" class="content" style="min-height: 60rem" >MRS. ELIZABETH ANOKYE<o:p></o:p>(PETITIONERS/APPELLANTS/
APPELLATS)<o:p></o:p>vs.<o:p></o:p>MRS MARGARET OSEI AND
8 0THERS<o:p></o:p>(RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS/
RESPONDENTS)<o:p></o:p>[SUPREME
COURT, ACCRA]<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in">

<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;
text-align:center;line-height:115%;border:none;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in;mso-padding-alt:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in">CIVIL
MOTION NO J8/2/2007&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; DATE: 5TH MARCH 2008<o:p></o:p>

</div>COUNSEL:<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
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EDWARD ANOKYE FOR THE APPLICANT. <o:p></o:p>

PAAPA DADSON FOR THE RESPONDENT. <o:p></o:p>

</div>CORAM:&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in">

MRS. WOOD C.J. (PRESIDING), BROBBEY
J.S.C., ANSAH J.S.C., MRS. ADINYIRA J.S.C., ASIAMAH J.S.C.<o:p></o:p>

</div><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
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RULING<o:p></o:p>

</div>MRS.
WOOD, C.J. <o:p></o:p>In
this motion, the Appellant Applicants pray for special leave to appeal the
decision of the Court of Appeal dated the 15th of April 2005 and a stay of
execution of the said decision. They contend that owing to a procedural
blunder, albeit on the part of their counsel — failing to obtain leave before
filing their initial appeal, — and other matters relative to it, they have been
disabled from filing a competent appeal within the time stipulated under the
Supreme Court rules CI 16. The application is brought under Article 131 (1)
(b), Article 131 (2) of the Constitution and section 4 (2) of the Courts Act,
Act 459 rules 7(2) and (4) of the Supreme Court Rules, CI 16. I do not think
the issues raised by this application require a setting out in extenso of the
various constitutional and other statutory provisions on which the application
is based. The respondents do not in any event challenge their applicability.
Their contention simply is that they are not entitled to this special right to
appeal. In the circumstances, what we have to examine firstly is the matters
that influence a grant or refusal of the order. <o:p></o:p>The
legal position is that in the area of judicial discretion, where cases are
dealt with purely on the merits and on a case by case basis, there can be no
judicial precedent properly so called. Nonetheless, there are standard
principles which guide our discretionary decision. It is these criteria which I
now examine. In Dolphyne (No) 2 v Speedline [1996-97] SCGLR 373, this
honourable court had opportunity to determine the general principles which
should guide the court and concluded that: <o:p></o:p>"The
principles to be applied as guides on which the Supreme Court might determine
whether to grant special leave to appeal or not were: <o:p></o:p>Where
there was a prima facie error on the face of the record; or a general principle
of law had arisen for the first time; or a decision by the Supreme Court on the
point sought to be appealed against would be advantageous to the public." <o:p></o:p>I
understand this last principle under (c) to be referable to not just any legal
question but those novel points of law that raise substantial issues of some
public importance. <o:p></o:p>Kotey
v Koletey [2000] SCGLR 417 and Ansah v Atsem [2001-2002] SCGLR expanded the law
further and observed that in such exercises, other factors such as public
policy, the need for litigation to come to an end, the need to avoid inordinate
disrespect for the rules of court and the need to avoid prejudice or hardship
or inconvenience to the party in whose favour the judgment which is to be
appealed against was rendered, must be given due consideration. <o:p></o:p>We
apply these principles to the peculiar facts of this case and we find ourselves
unable to exercise our discretion in the applicant's favour. This simple
landlord and tenant case, which from the onset was in any event completely
devoid of any novel, let alone substantial legal question of some public
importance has been in our courts for some thirteen years. Again, there is no
evidence to suggest that in the course of the appellate hearing, a substantial
legal issue of serious public interest arose for the court or this court's
determination. The proposed grounds of appeal, which are a repeat of those
submitted at the Court of Appeal, and which I have taken the liberty to reproduce,
do not also make any such disclosures. <o:p></o:p>They
read: <o:p></o:p>"The
judgment of the Court of Appeal was against the weight of evidence. <o:p></o:p>The
learned Court of Appeal erred by holding that the High Court Judge was right in
disturbing the finding of fact of the trial District Court. <o:p></o:p>The
Court of Appeal erred by holding that the suit was an abuse of the judicial
process. <o:p></o:p>The
Court of Appeal erred in holding that the reasons for coming for ejectment was
genuine as there was sufficient evidence to the contrary. <o:p></o:p>