[2010]DLCA4564 Login to Read Full Case <span style="font-size: 18px !important;"><p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;line-height:115%"><b><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height: 115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif";color:#00B0F0">ANGLOGOLD ASHANTI LTD<o:p></o:p></span></b></p><p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;line-height:115%"><i><span style="font-size:10.0pt;line-height: 115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif"">(DEFENDANT /APPELLANT)<o:p></o:p></span></i></p><p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;line-height:115%"><b><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height: 115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif";color:#00B0F0">vs<o:p></o:p></span></b></p><p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;line-height:115%"><b><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height: 115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif";color:#00B0F0">GEORGE SIAW YEBOAH<o:p></o:p></span></b></p><p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;line-height:115%"><i><span style="font-size:10.0pt;line-height: 115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif"">(PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT)<o:p></o:p></span></i></p><p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;line-height:115%"><span style="font-size:10.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif"">[COURT OF APPEAL, ACCRA]<o:p></o:p></span></p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in"> <p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;line-height:115%; border:none;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0in; mso-padding-alt:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in"><span style="font-size:10.0pt;line-height: 115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif"">H1/162/2010 DATE: 27th MAY 2010<o:p></o:p></span></p> </div><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify;line-height:115%"><b><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height: 115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif"">COUNSEL:<o:p></o:p></span></b></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify;line-height:115%"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif"">MR. NARTEY TETTEY FOR APPELLANTS<o:p></o:p></span></p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in"> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify;line-height:115%;border:none; mso-border-bottom-alt:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0in;mso-padding-alt:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif"">MR. JAMES AGBEDOR FOR RESPONDENTS<o:p></o:p></span></p> </div><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify;line-height:115%"><b><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height: 115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif"">CORAM: <o:p></o:p></span></b></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify;line-height:115%"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif"">J. B. AKAMBA J.A. PRESIDING, K. A. ACQUAYE J.A, C. J. HONYENUGA J.A<o:p></o:p></span></p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border-top:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-left:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;border-right:none; padding:1.0pt 0in 1.0pt 0in"> <p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;line-height:115%; border:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid windowtext 1.5pt;mso-border-bottom-alt: solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0in;mso-padding-alt:1.0pt 0in 1.0pt 0in"><b><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height: 115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif"">JUDGMENT<o:p></o:p></span></b></p> <p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;line-height:115%; border:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid windowtext 1.5pt;mso-border-bottom-alt: solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0in;mso-padding-alt:1.0pt 0in 1.0pt 0in"><b><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height: 115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif""><o:p> </o:p></span></b></p> </div><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify;line-height:115%"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif"">AKAMBA, J.A: <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify;line-height:115%"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif"">The appellant, a mining company in Obuasi, Ghana has a subsidiary company at Sugri in the Republic of Guinea. On 10th November 1994 the respondent was employed by the erstwhile Cluff Mining Company which was later acquired by the appellant and described as its Ayanfuri mine near Obuasi Ghana. In 1996 the appellant transferred the respondent to its Sugri mine in Guinea. Respondent was recalled to Ghana in 2005 to continue his employment in Obuasi and remained as such employee till November 2006 when he together with other workers was declared redundant. His terminal benefits were calculated and paid to him. The respondent however disputed the basis for calculating his terminal benefit as the same failed to take into account the period he worked as an expatriate in the Republic of Guinea. The respondent drew the attention of the appellant to the apparent miscalculation of his entitlements but this view was not shared by the appellant. Following the stalemate the respondent initiated an action at the Automated High Court Accra to claim what he perceived as due him. The High court entered judgment in favour of the respondent hence this appeal.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify;line-height:115%"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif"">In this appeal three grounds were formulated for determination by this court. These are that:<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;line-height:115%"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif"">(i) The learned trial judge erred in holding that the calculation of the plaintiff’s entitlements must include an amount for the period while he was engaged abroad.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;line-height:115%"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif"">(ii) The trial judge erred in holding that the plaintiff who was re-engaged on his return from abroad qualified as a category A or B employee.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;line-height:115%"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif"">(iii) The learned trial judge misconstrued the legal clauses 4.2.1, 4.2.2 or 4.2.4, as applying to the plaintiff.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify;line-height:115%"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif"">The resolution of this appeal just as the initial action before the trial High court hinges upon the true or proper interpretation of the scope of operation of exhibit A. In doing so it is important to state that exhibit A should be considered as a whole to be appreciated. This conforms to a basic rule of construction of documents that a document must be read as a whole in order to ascertain the intentions of the maker and thus give effect to and effectuate the true intentions. This court in the case of Boateng v Volta Aluminium Co. Ltd (1984-86) GLRD 85 approved the indelible dictum of Huddleston B in Wigsell v Corporation of School for Indigent Blind (1880) 43 LT 218 in the following words: <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;line-height:115%"><i><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height: 115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif"">“ In construing covenants, the fulfillment of the evident intention and meaning of the parties to them must be looked at, not confining oneself within the narrow limits of a literal interpretation; but taking more liberal and extended view, and contemplating at once the whole scope and object of the deed in which they are contained.” <o:p></o:p></span></i></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify;line-height:115%"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif""> In that case the employment of the appellant, a production supervisor was terminated on being given a month’s salary in lieu of notice. He claimed that the termination was unlawful as it contravened clause 3 of the conditions of his service which required that termination be subject only to the giving of ‘a notice of one month.’ Termination in lieu of notice was not provided for. He therefore by an originating summons sought an interpretation of the clause which provided that “involuntary termination of employment for cause shall require a month’s notice to the terminated supervisor.” The High Court ruled that clause 3 of the conditions of service implied that the employment could be terminated on payment of salary in lieu of notice and therefore the termination of the employment consequent upon payment of salary was not unlawful. On appeal against that interpretation, this Court in dismissing the appeal held that in construing clause 3 regard should be given to all four clauses in the agreement dealing with termination, the language used and all the provisions in the termination clauses should be looked at as a whole and every clause must be compared with the other and an entire sense made out of them with a view to discovering the true meaning and intentions of the parties. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify;line-height:115%"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Book Antiqua","serif"">This basic approach was also rightly adopted by Abban J (as he then was) in the case of Manu vs Emeruwa (1971) 1 GLR 442 for which I endorse and approve. In that case the plaintiff borrowed money from the defendant for three weeks for which he deposited his car together with all the documents on the car with the defendant as security. The terms of the transaction were embodied in a written document signed by both parties who were illiterates. The car was subsequently damaged by the defendant’s son when he was learning to drive with it. The plaintiff sued for damages for the use or misuse of his car. The issue turned on whether the transaction as embodied in the written agreement was a pledge or a mortgage. The court in determining that issue held that the written document must be read as a whole, that is to say that it must consider certain apparently ambiguous words such as “absolute assignment”, “covenant” and “absolutely” as well as clause 2 of the document which sta