E. K. SOSU, A. K. QUAYE & 1553 OTHERS (PLFFS/APPELLANTS) vs. GHANA PORTS AND HARBOURS AUTHORITY (DEFT/RESPONDENT) [2011]DLCA7889

E. K. SOSU, A. K. QUAYE & 1553 OTHERS (PLFFS/APPELLANTS) vs. GHANA PORTS AND HAR... [2011]DLCA7889

Date	2011-02-17
Suit No.	CIVIL APPEAL NO.: H1/227/2010
Citation No.	[2011]DLCA7889

HENRIETTA ABBAN (MRS.) J.A. (PRESIDING)

P. K. GYAESAYOR J.A. AND E. K. AYEBI J.A.

[2011]DLCA7889
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													<main id="main" class="content" style="min-height: 60rem" >E. K. SOSU, A. K. QUAYE &amp; 1553 OTHERS<o:p></o:p>(PLFFS/APPELLANTS)<o:p></o:p><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt;
line-height:115%;font-family:&quot;Book Antiqua&quot;,serif;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Book Antiqua&quot;;
mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Book Antiqua&quot;;color:#00B0F0">vs.<o:p></o:p>GHANA PORTS
AND HARBOURS AUTHORITY<o:p></o:p>(DEFT/RESPONDENT)<o:p></o:p>[COURT
OF APPEAL, ACCRA]<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0cm 0cm 1.0pt 0cm">

CIVIL
APPEAL NO.:&nbsp; H1/227/2010&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; DATE: 17TH
FEBRUARY, 2011<o:p></o:p>

</div>CORAM:<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0cm 0cm 1.0pt 0cm">

HENRIETTA
ABBAN (MRS.) J.A. (PRESIDING), P. K. GYAESAYOR J.A. AND E. K. AYEBI J.A.<o:p></o:p>

</div><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0cm 0cm 1.0pt 0cm">

</div>AYEBI J.A.<o:p></o:p>I have read in advance the opinion just delivered
by my learned brother Gyaesayor J.A.&nbsp; I
am entirely in agreement with him that this interlocutory appeal should fail
because the whole action is statute-barred not only by virtue of section 92(1)
of Ghana Ports and Harbours Authority Law, 1986 (PNDCL 160) but also by virtue
of section 4(1)(b) of the Limitation Act, 1972 (NRCD 54).<o:p></o:p>In the plaintiffs/appellants’ endorsement on the
writ, their claim is for “severance pay due plaintiffs in 1989 arising from
plaintiffs’ employment with defendant which was terminated in 1989”.&nbsp; It is clear from this endorsement that
plaintiffs/appellants’ cause of action against their employer, the
defendant/respondent herein arose in 1989.&nbsp;
That being so, this action launched in 2000 is completely out of time
and moribund in limine.<o:p></o:p>It is therefore not of place for the defendant/respondent
to set down for legal argument the issue as to “whether the plaintiffs’ action
herein is statute-barred by virtue of section 92(1) of Ghana Ports and Harbours
Authority Law, 1986 (PNDCL 160)”.&nbsp; In fact
this is the sole statute pleaded and set down for legal argument.<o:p></o:p>But in her submission counsel for the
defendant/respondent invoked section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1972 (NRCD 54) to
further show that the action being founded on a breach of a contractual right
is as at 2000 when it was launched statute-barred.&nbsp; The application of s.4 of NRCD 54 is my
concern in this short comment.<o:p></o:p>It is provided in section 4(1)(b) of NRCD 54 that:<o:p></o:p>“A person shall not bring an action after the
expiration of six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued, in
the case of <o:p></o:p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; (b)&nbsp; an action founded on simple contract”<o:p></o:p>Under the rules of court, Order 11 r.8(1) of C.I.
47, any limitation provision amongst others which a defendant alleges makes a
claim not maintainable or which if not pleaded specifically, might take the
opposite party by surprise, must be pleaded specifically.&nbsp; But this limitation provision in NRCD 54 was
not pleaded by defendant/respondent.<o:p></o:p>Counsel for plaintiffs/appellants in his reply to
the legal submissions of the defendant/respondent limited himself only to
s.92(1) of PNDC Law 160.&nbsp; When the court
reminded him that the defendant/respondent’s counsel’s submission was extended
to s.4 of the Limitation Act, appellants’ counsel responded that, whether or
not the action is statute-barred under s.4 of NRCD 54 has not also been set
down for legal argument.&nbsp; Rather counsel
for appellant accused the trial judge for giving a hearing to the
defendant/respondent’s counsel on an issue not set down before the court.<o:p></o:p>However, the trial judge in his ruling gave
consideration to s.4 of NRCD 54 as an additional reason why the action is
statute-barred.&nbsp; In this appeal two
grounds were based on the application of s.4 of NRCD 54 to this case.&nbsp; They are <o:p></o:p>“(ii)&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The judge erred in applying the Limitation
Decree to the case when the same had not been pleaded by the defendant.<o:p></o:p>(iv)&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The judge erred in hearing defendant on
matters which were not set down for pre-determination when the court heard the
objection of the respondent”<o:p></o:p>I do not think the two grounds taken together is
tenable in the circumstances of this particular case.&nbsp; In paragraph 16 of the statement of defence,
there is a specific plea that the action is statute-barred in terms of s.92(1)
of PNDCL 160.&nbsp; This is followed in
paragraph 17 by a general plea that a preliminary objection will be raised on
the ground that the action is statute-barred.<o:p></o:p>