RANSFORD OPOKU & ORS. vs. LIBHERR FRANCE SAS AND PAUL JOOSTEN [2011]DLSC2666

Date	2011-11-23
Suit No.	CIVIL APPEAL NO. J4/35/2011
Citation No.	[2011]DLSC2666

ATUGUBAJSC (PRESIDING)

DR. DATE-BAH JSC

ANSAH JSC

BONNIE JSC

AKOTO-BAMFO JSC

APPELLANT APPEARS IN PERSON

KIMATHI KUENYEHIA (WITH HIM SIKA KUENYEHIA AND FRED AWINDAOGO) FOR THE RESPONDENTS.

[2011]DLSC2666
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													<main id="main" class="content" style="min-height: 60rem" >RANSFORD OPOKU &amp; ORS.<o:p></o:p>vs.<o:p></o:p>LIBHERR FRANCE SAS AND
PAUL JOOSTEN<o:p></o:p>&nbsp;[SUPREME COURT, ACCRA]<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in">

CIVIL APPEAL NO. J4/35/2011 &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
DATE: 23RD NOVEMBER, 2011<o:p></o:p>

</div>COUNSEL:&nbsp;&nbsp; <o:p></o:p>APPELLANT APPEARS IN PERSON,<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
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KIMATHI
KUENYEHIA (WITH HIM SIKA KUENYEHIA AND FRED AWINDAOGO) FOR THE RESPONDENTS.<o:p></o:p>

</div>CORAM:
<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
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ATUGUBAJSC (PRESIDING), DR.
DATE-BAH JSC, ANSAH JSC, BONNIE JSC , AKOTO-BAMFO JSC<o:p></o:p>

</div><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
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JUDGEMENT <o:p></o:p>

</div>ATUGUBA, J.S.C:<o:p></o:p>The
appellant had been employed by the 1st respondent as Human Resource
Executive. Sometime in February 2009, the appellant who describes himself as a
“locked out and victimized whistle blower” brought some police officers to the
respondent’s premises, without permission. The 2nd respondent
claimed that the appellant threatened him when he asked why the appellant had
brought police officers to the premises. The incident was reported to the
Airport Police Station and the appellant was invited for questioning. He
admitted bringing the police officers but was unable to give any reasons for
his conduct. The appellant then proceeded on leave after the incident. Based on
the appellant’s conduct, the 1st respondent wrote a letter to the
appellant through its managing director terminating his employment. The
termination was to take effect on his return from paid leave, on 4th
April, 2009.<o:p></o:p>Meanwhile,
the appellant had, while still on leave, filed a suit with six other employees
against the respondent. They claimed that the1st respondent had rendered them
redundant and were therefore entitled to a redundancy package.<o:p></o:p>On 3rd
April, 2009, the appellant filed a motion on notice for committal for contempt
against the 1st and 2nd respondents on the basis that the
2nd respondent had terminated his employment after he had filed a
suit for redundancy pay.<o:p></o:p>The
trial judge held, inter alia, that
the termination of the Appellant’s employment amounted to contempt as it was
intended to frustrate and to prejudice the outcome of the pending suit and
bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute.
The trial judge ordered the respondents to reinstate the appellant until the
final determination of the substantive case. The respondents appealed to the
Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal unanimously set aside the ruling of the
trial court. At page 233 of the record of appeal, the Court of Appeal held that
<o:p></o:p>“…the termination of the employment of the
respondent during the pendency of the substantive action in the court below has
no bearing at all on the subject-matter of the suit before the trial court.”
(e.s).<o:p></o:p>The
appellant filed the instant appeal, pleading 13 grounds. In sum, the appellant
herein claims that the Court of Appeal erred when it set aside the ruling of
the trial court because it did not fully consider the ramifications of the
termination of the appellant’s employment on the appellant’s pending suit
against the respondents.<o:p></o:p>Contempt
of court is a long standing power of the common law. Its nature is fairly well
settled. Its application however can be problematic in the particular
circumstances of a case. A particular area has been the effect of the issue of
a writ of summons on the rights of the parties thereto. There is an English
view that the mere issue of a writ does not preclude a party from exercising his
rights. The typical occasion of contempt has been conduct prejudicial to the
determination of a pending motion.<o:p></o:p>Nonetheless,
in Ghana the courts do assert contempt in relation to prejudice to the res litiga in a pending action. See Balogun v. Edusei (1938) 3 W.A.L.R 547, Dombo v. Narh 1970 CC 68, Republic v. Akenten II; Ex parte Yankyera
(1993-94) 1 GLR 246 C.A., and Republic v.
Eha II and Others; Ex parte Togobo &amp; Others (2003-2005) 1 GLR 328 C.A.,
among others. <o:p></o:p>&nbsp;The general principle as to the question of
contempt has been well laid down per Adade JSC in Republic v. Mensa-Bonsu and Others; Exparte Attorney-General (1995-1996)
1 GLR 377 at 403 thus: <o:p></o:p>“There
are different forms of contempt. Underlying all of them, however, is one basic
notion, that the roadways and highways of
public justice should at all times be free from obstruction. Conduct which
tends to create such an obstruction constitutes contempt. Thus interfering with witnesses or jurors;
frightening off parties to litigation; refusing to answer questions in court;
commenting on pending proceedings in such a manner as to prejudice the outcome;
running down the courts and the judges; refusing to obey an order of the court
– any of these, if calculated to, or tend to, impede or obstruct the course of
justice will constitute contempt. And conduct complained of therefore must
be viewed and assessed against the backdrop of this basic principle.” (e.s)<o:p></o:p>