THE REPUBLIC vs. THE HIGH COURT EX PARTE: TWENEBOAH KODUAH [2014]DLSC2928

Date	2014-07-29
Suit No.	CIVIL APPEAL NO.J5/22/2014
Citation No.	[2014]DLSC2928

ANSAH J.S.C. (PRESIDING)

OWUSU J.S.C.

DOTSE J.S.C.

GBADEGBE J.S.C.

AKAMBA J.S.C.

HON. ALEXANDER KWAMENA AFENYO MARKIN ESQ. WITH HIM MISS

BERNINA KORKOR OKUTU FOR THE APPLICANT.

JACQUELINE AVOTRI FOR THE INTERESTED PARTY.

[2014]DLSC2928
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													<main id="main" class="content" style="min-height: 60rem" >THE REPUBLIC<o:p></o:p>vs.<o:p></o:p>THE HIGH
COURT<o:p></o:p>EX PARTE:
TWENEBOAH KODUAH<o:p></o:p>&nbsp;[SUPREME COURT, ACCRA]<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
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CIVIL APPEAL
NO.J5/22/2014&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;DATE: 29TH JULY, 2014<o:p></o:p>

</div>COUNSEL:&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <o:p></o:p>HON.
ALEXANDER KWAMENA AFENYO MARKIN ESQ. WITH HIM MISS BERNINA KORKOR OKUTU FOR THE
APPLICANT.<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
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JACQUELINE
AVOTRI FOR THE INTERESTED PARTY.<o:p></o:p>

</div>CORAM:
<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
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</div><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
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<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;
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padding:0in;mso-padding-alt:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in">JUDGMENT<o:p></o:p>

</div><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>GBADEGBE
JSC:&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <o:p></o:p>My Lords, I have had the advantage of reading in
draft the judgment about to be read by my worthy brother, Dotse JSC in these
proceedings and much as I think that the said delivery has raised interesting points
of law and in particular the need for those responsible for carrying out the
objectives of Economic and Organised Crime Office Act, 2010 (Act 804)to comply
with the provisions of the law, I am unable for reasons that follow shortly to
agree with the conclusion therein reached by him. In my thinking,&nbsp; as certiorari is a discretionary remedy, the
applicant&nbsp; by waiting &nbsp;so long is not only out &nbsp;of time by virtue of the rules of this court
but applying the decision of this court in the&nbsp;
case of The Republic v High
Court, Accra Ex parte Nil Nueh Odonkor, Suit Number J5/26/2014 dated&nbsp; 22 July 2014 (Unreported)to the facts of this
case, I am of the opinion that the period from the making of the order of 19
December 2012 to the date the application herein was filed- 14 March 2014 is
too long to ripen such a stale application into an effective application in so
far as the ninety days rule goes and accordingly as the applicant has not been
able to provide any&nbsp; reasons for such
inordinate delay,&nbsp; this should be fatal to
the application. This aside, an applicant who seeks to invoke our jurisdiction
by way of judicial review in the nature of certiorari is deemed to know the
time limit provided by rule 62 of the Supreme Court Rules and yet seeks no
order from us extending such time in his favour must face the attributes that
arise from such a delay. In my opinion once the application before us is out of
time, we cannot inquire into it on the merits. In this regard, notice is taken
of the fact that before the applicant’s journey out of the jurisdiction of this
court, he was indeed aware that his account had been frozen as indeed, he
testified to in paragraphs (d) and (e) of his supporting affidavit, a fact which
renders his failure to seek an order extending time in his favour quite
unacceptable particularly when acting by counsel.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>It is observed that although the rules contained in
Part Six of CI 16, the Supreme Court Rules, have made no express provision for
extension of time in relation to applications that come under this part, I
think that the existence of that rule in rule 60 in relation to Part Five,
which regulates review applications is a clear indication that the rules
recognise the power of the court&nbsp; when so
satisfied to extend time in order to&nbsp;
enable matters which by virtue of the strict application of the rules
are time barred such as the ruling of 19 December 2012 in order to have such
applications determined following the grant of extension of time. I do not
think that the emerging practice by which counsel basing themselves merely on
the allegation of nullity of rulings, judgments and orders refrain from seeking
orders for extension of time is a healthy practice having regard to the fact
that time limits laid down by law are intended to be strictly applied
particularly in cases where no prior application is made to the court for
extension of time and in my view without&nbsp;
time being extended in favour of the applicant, the consequences of&nbsp; rule 60 must fall because this is a just
instance of its falling.&nbsp; I think there
is settled judicial opinion to support the contention that a judgment and or
order of a court of competent jurisdiction requires competent proceedings to
destroy the consequences that flow from it; a principle that recognises due
process requirements and the need for parties to avail themselves of remedies
that the law provides within the confines of the law. This, in my view is
sufficient to dispose of the application in so far as relief 1 relating to the
order of 19 December 2012 goes.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>&nbsp;I now turn
to the ruling of 12 February 2014. The application relating to this which was filed
on 14 March 2014 comes within the stipulation of ninety days in rule 62. &nbsp;It has been urged on us that the said ruling
in so far as it seeks to confirm the earlier one dated 19 December 2012 was in
error and not only that but is an instance of excess of jurisdiction as the
conditions precedent to the making of an order for confirmation under section 51
of the law were never present. In my view the application resulting in the
order of 12 February 2014 is not directed at </main>