NURU MOHAMMED vs. NEOL ARCTON-TETTEH, THE MINISTER FOR INFORMATION AND THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL [2019]DLHC10316

NURU MOHAMMED vs. NEOL ARCTON-TETTEH, THE MINISTER FOR INFORMATION AND THE ATTOR... [2019]DLHC10316

Date	2019-10-31
Suit No.	SUIT NO. GJ/008/2018
Citation No.	[2019]DLHC10316

HER LADYSHIP JUSTICE ANANDA J. AIKINS (MRS).

IGNATIUS DE PAUL COUNSEL FOR THE PLAINTIFF ABSENT

GIFTY KYEI COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENDANTS PRESENT

[2019]DLHC10316
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													<main id="main" class="content" style="min-height: 60rem" >NURU MOHAMMED<o:p></o:p>(PLAINTIFF)<o:p></o:p>vs.<o:p></o:p>NEOL ARCTON-TETTEH, THE MINISTER FOR
INFORMATION AND THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL<o:p></o:p>(DEFENDANTS)<o:p></o:p>[HIGH COURT, ACCRA]<o:p></o:p><div style="border-top: none; border-right: none; border-left: none; border-image: initial; border-bottom-width: 1.5pt; border-bottom-color: windowtext; padding: 0cm 0cm 1pt;">

<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="margin-bottom:0cm;margin-bottom:.0001pt;
text-align:center;border:none;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0cm;mso-padding-alt:0cm 0cm 1.0pt 0cm">SUIT
NO. GJ/008/2018&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; DATE:
31ST OCTOBER
2019<o:p></o:p>

</div>COUNSEL:<o:p></o:p>IGNATIUS DE PAUL, COUNSEL FOR THE PLAINTIFF ABSENT<o:p></o:p><div style="border-top: none; border-right: none; border-left: none; border-image: initial; border-bottom-width: 1.5pt; border-bottom-color: windowtext; padding: 0cm 0cm 1pt;">

GIFTY KYEI, COUNSEL FOR THE
DEFENDANTS PRESENT<o:p></o:p>

HER LADYSHIP JUSTICE ANANDA J. AIKINS (MRS).<o:p></o:p>

</div>&nbsp;RULING
ON WRITTEN ARGUMENTS FILED BY BOTH PARTIES PURSUANT TO ORDER OF THE COURT DATED
12TH APRIL 2019, SETTING DOWN THE ACTION FOR LEGAL ARGUMENTS<o:p></o:p>On
the 12th day of April, 2019, this Court set down for determination
by way of written arguments the legal issues raised in paragraphs 3 and 17 of
the statement of defence of the defendants. Those two paragraphs of the said statement
of defence are as follows:-<o:p></o:p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; “3.
The defendants further answer that the plaintiff’s right to institute this &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; action against the defendants is
extinguished as same is statute barred &nbsp;&nbsp; pursuant
to Section 3(1) of the Limitation Act, 1974 (Act 54).<o:p></o:p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 17.
The defendants further contend that the plaintiff who has gone to sleep on his rights if any and has subsequently become
statute barred from instituting &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; this
present action cannot claim further compensation and damages for loss of &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; income as equity does not aid the indolent.”<o:p></o:p>In
her written submissions the counsel for the defendants contended that the
action of the plaintiff is statute barred and that same ought to be struck out
by the Court as it discloses no reasonable cause of action against the
defendants. Counsel for defendants relied on Section 3(1) of the Limitation Act, NRCD 54 of 1974 and also on the Supreme Court
case of BOGOSU LTD. vs NTRAKWA [2011] 1 SCGLR at 417.<o:p></o:p>According
to the submissions of Counsel, the plaintiff’s writ of summons and statement of
claim show that the accident the plaintiff complains of happened in the year
2012, precisely on the 22nd day of September of that year and that
the plaintiff instituted this present action in January 2018, three clear years
after the expiration of the period given by the Limitation Act for the
institution of such actions claiming damages for negligence, nuisance or breach
of duty etc. <o:p></o:p>The
Counsel for the defendants rely on Section 3(1) of the above quoted Act which
states<o:p></o:p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 3(1)
“An action claiming damages for negligence, nuisance or breach of duty &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; (howsoever the duty exists); where
the damages claimed by the plaintiff for the &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; negligence,
nuisance or breach of duty consist of or include damages in respect of personal injuries to any person,
shall not be brought after the &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; expiration
of three years from the date on which the
cause of action accrued.”<o:p></o:p>She
therefore contends that since the time limited by the Limitations Act, 1974,
for the institution of the plaintiff’s writ had elapsed, the plaintiff has no
cause of action against the defendants and so his writ and statement of claim
should be struck out by the Court. <o:p></o:p>In
his reply to the written submissions of the defendants’ Counsel, the Counsel
for the plaintiff drew the Court’s attention to Sections 23 and 24 of the same
Limitations Act (NRCD 54) and stated that those sections permitted the
plaintiff to apply to the Court for leave to institute the instant action and further
that the plaintiff, being aware of the lapse of the statutory period within
which to sue the defendants, first applied to the Court under Sections 23 and
24 of the Act for leave to commence his action and that the Court on the 20th
day of November, 2017 granted him leave to issue his writ against the
defendants herein. The said leave was filed in this Court on 7th
February, 2019 as part of plaintiff’s exhibits to be relied on during trial. <o:p></o:p>The
Counsel for plaintiff further submitted that the leave granted the plaintiff
under Sections 23 and 24 of NRCD 54 still remains valid and has not been set
aside or nullified by the Court and therefore the defendant’s request for the
plaintiff’s action to be struck out as being statute barred and also that it discloses
no reasonable cause of action against the defendants should not be entertained
by the Court.<o:p></o:p>